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Executive Summary 
A three-day policy seminar on Competition, 
Productivity and Privatisation, organised by 
Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis 
(BIDPA) and Botswana National Productivity Centre 
(BNPC) and sponsored by Commonwealth 
Secretariat, was held 21-23 April, 1997 in Gaborone, 
Botswana. The seminar provided a unique opportunity 
for Botswana public policy-makers and private sector 
leaders to share ideas and experiences with African as 
well as other counterparts from Commonwealth 
countries in the area of public sector reform in general 
and privatisation in particular. The main points and 
lessons leamt through the seminar discussions are 
summarised below. 
The need for privatising is perceived to be less 
pressing in Botswana than in other African countries. 
Botswana's comfortable financial situation and lack of 
external pressure for privatisation has led 
policy-makers to believe that they can take their time 
to consider how privatisation should be done in 
Botswana. 
A logical approach is to first monitor the activities and 
measure the performance of public enterprises and, in 
some cases, of particular components of such 
enterprises. Having identified the scope for improving 
productivity and enhancing efficiency and 
effectiveness, the next stage would then be to 
determine whether and how selected features of 
private enterprise could be introduced so as to achieve 
better results. This may take the form of introducing 
greater competition into areas previously served by 
entrenched monopolies, or it may take the form of 
selling to the private sector some peripheral activities 
of government, or public corporations or it may entail 
the establishment of commercially determined 
performance targets for public enterprises. 
Privatisation must be well defined in any privatisation 
programme. Privatisation may be used to refer to: 
• the transfer of ownership from the public to 
the private sector; 
• the leasing of such assets while maintaining 
public ownership; 
• the transfer of management of public entities 
to the private sector through management 
contracts; 
• contracting out (out-sourcing) of public 
services to the private sector; 
• deregulation and liberalisation. 
Potential benefits and costs of privatisation must be 
critically examined and evaluated. Privatisation plans 
should identify ways to overcome or mitigate the 
worst potential impacts of privatisation and structural 
transformation and to support and reinforce positive 
outcomes. 
In the early stages, it is important to develop the 
technical skills needed to execute a privatisation 
programme. Rather than making elaborate lists of 
enterprises to be privaised, identify three or four 
agencies and use them to demonstrate and learn the 
process of privatisation. It Would also be useful to 
have a closer look at the experience of other similar 
countries. 
Having determined privatisation goals and prospects, 
a privatisation plan should be developed clearly 
stating the scope, magnitude and procedures for 
privatisation. It should also identify the privatisation 
agency and its responsibilities and how institutions 
will be developed to support implementation. 
Privatisation requires a managerial set-up that ensures 
speed, transparency and consistency of 
implementation. This entails developing a strategy for 
managing the programme and choosing the 
appropriate methods of privatisation. 
The choice of privatisation method depends on 
several factors including the objectives of the 
government; the financial condition and performance 
record of the state-owned enterprise (SOE); and the 
ability to mobilise private sector resources, 
particularly through the domestic capital market 
Privatisation involves a lot of contractual 
arrangements and monitoring mechanisms which 
require strong institutional capacity. During the 
implementation of privatisation, governments must 
pay special attention to protecting the interests of 
workers who will be displaced by restructuring and 
divestiture of SOEs. 
Competition is the best regulator and as such it 
should be encouraged wherever possible. As part of 
the privatisation process, it is prudent for governments 
to review commercial and business laws with a view 
to identifying any weaknesses in their enabling and 
regulatory functions so that the appropriate remedial 
action can be taken. Among the laws that will require 
review are those relating to ownership and transfer of 
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immovable commercial property; the prerogatives of 
the state in determining the use of land; environmental 
protection; types, formation, organisation and limited 
liability of companies; various types of commercial 
contracts; intellectual property; securities and stock 
markets; banking and financial services; the fiscal 
regime; competition and restrictive business practices; 
insolvency; labour law; accounting and accounting 
standards; and dispute settlements and procedures. 
The legal steps needed to prepare an enterprise for 
privatisation will depend upon the pre-existing legal 
form of the enterprise in question. If a public 
enterprise is being run as a department of government 
or other integral unit of the government, it will be 
necessary to "corporatise" the enterprise. In 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, this will usually mean 
turning the government department or other such unit 
into a limited liability company. 
Financial sector reform is necessary to integrate 
segmented money and capital markets, create 
competitive markets and contribute to successful 
privatisation by enabling the private sector to play a 
leading role in economic development and helping to 
breakdown the inertia about state ownership. 
The key issues of Corporate Governance in the 
privatisation process which are subject to debate are 
the range of responsibilities, the extent and the degree 
of duty of care of the Board of Directors of a 
company to the shareholder / stakeholder. This relates 
to the amount of trust, reliability and confidence the 
public has in the private sector to manage the affairs 
of public services which are transferred from the 
public sector to the private sector. 
The performance of public sector institutions has been 
disappointing, to say the least, in many developing 
countries. While privatisation is among the policy 
options for public sector reform, other reform 
mechanisms can also be powerful tools when properly 
implemented. 
The Tanzanian experience shows that improving 
individual and collective performance requires 
changing peoples' attitudes and values, together with 
a complete overhaul of management systems. In 
Tanzania, problems have been identified and 
strategies have been developed to overcome them. 
These included increasing the involvement of the 
private sector in service delivery as it continues to 
grow and mature and taking initiatives to improve the 
performance of the public sector workforce. 
BIDPA 
Judging from experience in Singapore, harnessing the 
qualitivity (combining quality and productivity) of 
staff seems like a good idea that can be successfully 
done. But it involves conviction, determination and 
tenacity. Top management must be willing to listen, 
superv isors must be willing to change, and staff at the 
operating level must be willing to trust the 
organisation. 
The lesson learnt from Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited 
case study is that the development of strategic 
alliances is one way of enhancing the operational 
effectiveness and efficiency as well as productivity of 
state enterprises. The essence of turnaround is to focus 
on core-business activities and sharpen competitive 
advantages. Outsourcing (contracting out) or 
sub-contracting is one avenue through which 
competition and productivity can be enhanced. 
Dairiboard Zimbabwe Ltd has successfully contracted 
out non-core activities and franchised its depots. 
Commercialisation was not the goal of the 
restructuring but rather a necessary step towards 
privatisation of Kenya Airways. The success of the 
Kenya Airways commercialisation and privatisation 
experience can be attributed first and foremost to the 
Government's political will and clear objectives and 
sense of purpose. The three other factors are the 
choice of the top management, the choice of a 
competent privatisation advisor and the choice and 
use of a competent strategic partner. 
The Jamaican experience confirms that: 
• Privatisation must be a part of a 
comprehensive reform programme. 
• Privatising public utilities requires a new 
regulatory framework. 
• Privatisation will only succeed if the process 
is transparent 
• Underdeveloped capital markets in 
themselves are not major impediments to 
privatisation. 
• In the early stages, it is important to develop 
the technical skills needed to execute the 
privatisation programme. 
• Old company laws require updating. 
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• Foreign participation in privatised enterprises 
must be carefully considered and planned. 
• In a small country, a centralised privatisation 
institution is advisable. 
Malaysia's privatisation policy has proven to be 
successful due to several factors: 
• The acceptance of the privatisation 
programme by both the Government and 
people. 
• Privatisation is based on the Malaysia 
Incorporated concept, that is to foster close 
co-operation between the private and public 
sector to achieve economic development. 
• The Government is concerned with the 
viability and performance of the companies 
that undertake privatisation projects. 
• The privatisation program is broad-based 
covering various sectors of the economy. 
• Malaysia's privatisation process is 
transparent 
• The Privatisation Action Plan is made public 
and thus the public has full knowledge of 
entities to be privatised 
• To encourage the private sector participation, 
various incentives have been given. 
• The conversion of SOEs into a corporatised 
entity in cases where direct privatisation may 
not receive full support initially. 
In Zambia, the policy is that investors may not 
purchase SOEs if they are not able to meet the 
financing requirements of capital investment and 
working capital for the enterprise. Given the lack of 
domestic finance, creative methods to allow Zambian 
participation in the privatisation programme were 
designed. These included: 
• allowing Zambian individuals, management 
and employees to defer payment for the 
purchase of shares. 
• setting up a Privatisation Trust Fund (PTF) to 
promote broad-based local participation. The 
PTF has been set up as a warehousing 
arrangement whereby the minority 
percentage of the SOE shares reserved for 
Zambians are retained in trust. The shares are 
transferred to the PTF at no value. Zambian 
individuals and institutional investors are the 
sole potential buyers of the primary share 
offers. 
The Zambian Privatisation Agency has a Social 
Impact Department that explains the process of 
privatisation and workers rights to all employees who 
are to be affected by the programme. Informing the 
general public on the issues of privatisation has also 
been an important element in the programme. 
In Botswana, the Government does not yet have a 
policy on privatisation and that has been a subject of 
debate among the politicians and others as well. The 
legal framework needs to be changed, if privatisation 
is to be seriously considered. The statutes establishing 
parastatals will have to be changed to make them into 
companies under the Companies Act 
A recent report by BOCCIM recommended six areas 
which the process of privatisation in Botswana should 
address: 
• Changing relations between the Government 
and parastatals. 
• Restructuring parastatals where necessary. 
• Restructuring commercially oriented 
government departments. 
• Changing the roles of local councils. 
• Removing any obstacles at each stage of 
transactions. 
• Selecting an appropriate method of sale. 
However, most of the report's recommendations are of 
a general nature corresponding to hypothetical 
situations. They do not suggest a specific policy 
action as a logical response to an identified problem. 
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Introduction 
Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis 
(BIDPA) and Botswana National Productivity Centre 
(BNPC) organised a three-day policy seminar on 
Competition, Productivity and Privatisation. 
Sponsored by Commonwealth Secretariat 
(Management and Training Services Division), the 
seminar was held 21-23 April, 1997 at the Gaborone 
Sun Hotel in Gaborone, Botswana. 
The seminar provided a unique opportunity for 
Botswana public policy-makers and private sector 
leaders to share ideas and experiences with African as 
well as other counterparts from Commonwealth 
countries in the area of public sector reform in general 
and privatisation in particular. The participants from 
outside Botswana included privatisation experts and 
staff members of the Commonwealth Secretariat and 
privatisation practitioners from Jamaica, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Botswana participants included: 
Permanent Secretaries and/or representatives from 
the Office of the President, Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning, Ministry of Mineral 
Resources and Water Affairs, Ministry of Works, 
Transport and Communications, and Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry; heads of parastatals and/or 
representatives from Botswana Housing Corporation, 
Botswana Development Corporation, Botswana 
Power Corporation, Botswana Telecommunications 
Corporation, Water Utilities Corporation, Botswana 
Meat Commission, University of Botswana, Air 
Botswana and Bank of Botswana; politicians from 
different political parties; and Private Sector 
representatives from Botswana Confederation of 
Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM), 
Botswana Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(BCCI) and Botswana Federation of Trade Unions 
(BFTU). 
In his introductory remarks, Mr. Jan isaksen, 
Executive Director of BIDPA, pointed out that 
Botswana's route to privatisation was likely to differ 
from that of many other African countries. The need 
for privatising is perceived to be less pressing in 
Botswana than in other countries on this continent 
The fact that public enterprises are small in number 
and relatively well run is part of the reasons. Other 
factors are related to the fact that Botswana's economy 
has relatively been well managed at the macro level. 
This has meant less need for advice from the 
international community about what Botswana should 
or shouldn't do. Nevertheless, right from the start - if 
one reads through the Botswana's development plans 
starting from number one - Botswana has had a strong 
policy on promoting the private sector role in 
economic development. 
The perceived need for taking measures towards 
privatisation has become more and more pronounced 
as the public sector became a major source of GDP 
growth and is now too big in the opinion of many 
Batswana. Botswana's particular situation has led 
policy-makers to believe that they can take their time 
to consider how privatisation should be done in 
Botswana. Botswana's Confederation of Commerce 
and Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM) has played a 
prominent role in the privatisation campaign. This 
seminar serves as an addition to BOCCIM's 
contributions by highlighting not only what is good 
about privatisation but also what is bad and how to 
make it successful. 
Mr. Max Mwanahiba of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat highlighted some of the Commonwealth's 
basic characteristics. The Commonwealth is mostly 
concerned in the development of human resource 
capacity in member countries. Since human resources 
are the most critical assets in any country and in any 
organisation, the Commonwealth believes that it is 
making a useful contribution to the growth of 
Commonwealth countries through human resource 
development 
The commonwealth is a voluntary association of 
independent sovereign states consulting and 
co-operating in the common interest of their peoples 
to promote international understanding, world peace 
and sustainable development The association at 
present consists of 53 member countries from 
different races, religions, languages and cultures. It is 
a cross-section of the international community both 
north and south from six continents, a quarter of the 
world's population and it is part of the intrinsic fabric 
of contemporary multinational relations. Some of its 
members are among the highest income per capita 
countries and others among the lowest; some are large 
and others are very small. 
The Commonwealth is the second largest 
multinational community outside the United Nations. 
Its diversity is considered a source of strength. The 
Commonwealth Secretariat draws on that strength and 
acts as a link complementing member states, 
co-operation and serving as an enormously variable 
melting pot of common experiences. Member 
countries are linked together not by any form or 
charter as in the UN system but by shared vision of a 
community of equals consulting and co-operating 
with one another for the common good of its peoples. 
Most important for this seminar, member countries are 
linked together by a set of guiding principles which 
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were first pronounced in Singapore in 1971 and have 
been reiterated at various Commonwealth heads of 
governments meetings in Zimbabwe 1991, Cyprus 
1993 and most recently in New Zealand 1995. 
The principles arising out of those declarations have 
been a set of priorities which include public service 
reform, and restructuring and privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises. The Commonwealth 
Secretariat has sought to foster collaboration through 
the exchange of experiences between member 
countries as they face common challenges of 
improving public service performance and 
implementing public service reform and privatisation. 
The Commonwealth has been at the forefront of 
pioneering the concepts of technical co-operation 
among developing countries. Countries at similar 
stages of development are best placed to identify not 
only their own but also each other's problems and to 
work together towards the solution of those problems. 
The Commonwealth Secretariat has considerable 
comparative advantages in playing the role assigned 
to it It provides a uniquely positive environment for 
collaboration and learning from successful 
experiences. The many cultural ties arising out of a 
common heritage have facilitated sharing of problems 
and achievements between public servants, political 
leaders and corporate executives across die 
Commonwealth. The Secretariat has developed an 
integrated portfolio of services designed to respond to 
the needs of member countries for technical 
assistance. These include applied research, practical 
programs which generate information, ideas, 
case-studies, models, and issues which member 
countries share together. These ideas, models and 
issues are discussed at policy workshops such as this 
one, where the accumulated knowledge is 
disseminated, consensus is built, and appropriate 
reform policies and programs are initiated within 
member countries. The workshops and seminars, in 
turn, generate papers, cases and resource materials 
which are published. The Commonwealth Secretariat 
also provides specialised training to build a stock of 
knowledge and skills required for the implementation 
of specific public service reform and privatisation 
programs. It provides short-term policy advisory 
services to assist member countries in the actual 
implementation of their reform programs. In addition, 
it provides technical experts who render services from 
one week to two years or more to assist member 
countries to undertake these reform and privatisation 
programs successfully. 
This seminar provides a unique opportunity to address 
the principal concerns and to consider policy options 
and strategies of how to implement and manage the 
process of reform towards a new public administration 
and privatisation of state-owned enterprises to the best 
advantage of Botswana. The Secretariat stands ready 
to provide further assistance at the request of the 
government of Botswana. 
The Minister of Mineral Resources and Water 
Affairs, Mr. David Magang, officially opened the 
seminar. He indicated that when Botswana obtained 
independence in 1966, there was very little private 
sector and the government had to intervene in the 
creation of public enterprises to provide various goods 
and services. 
The 1980s, however, saw a global sea-change in 
global thinking, with growing acceptance that socialist 
systems and associated repression of market forces, 
contributed to economic failures, while free markets 
and private enterprise encouraged competition 
resulting in greater efficiency and relative economic 
success. Naturally, these global shifts in thinking had 
profound effects on the policy dialogue between on 
the one hand the multilateral agencies of the first 
world such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, and on the other hand the 
governments of the developing world. The 
multilateral agencies insisted upon public sector 
reform as an integral part of their structural 
adjustment programs. 
For various reasons, Botswana stood very much on 
the side line of the wind of change which occurred in 
the 1980s. Through a mixture of good fortune and 
good macroeconomic management, Botswana's 
economy was becoming stronger during the last three 
decades. Botswana had no need for structural 
adjustment programs and therefore no need to accept 
the policy conditions which accompanied such 
programs. 
Even though there is no external force pressing 
privatisation upon Botswana, there is a growing 
realisation that in certain cases and under certain 
conditions it may be a useful policy instrument which 
can be used to the national advantage and the logic is 
as follows: 
• If productivity can be improved and 
efficiency can be enhanced, we will have a 
better chance of attracting investments 
which can lead to sustainable diversification 
of the economy. 
• Some public enterprises are not as efficient 
as they should be and their workers are not as 
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productive as they might be, for instance, in a 
more competitive commercial environment. 
• Hence the need to investigate ways of 
commercialising the activities of public 
enterprises and to consider whether private 
ownership will perform better in various 
kinds of market structures. 
If we can harness the benefits of privatisation while 
avoiding the worst of the problems which go with it, 
we may find that privatisation is a policy instrument 
which can be used to promote economic development, 
improve the production and distribution of services, 
streamline government structures and re-invigorate 
industries which have hitherto been owned or 
controlled by the state. In a nutshell, therefore, the 
role of government should shift away from owning 
and doing towards co-ordinating and facilitating 
productive activities. This is not to say that there will 
be a wholesale sell-off of all public enterprises. 
Rather, the issue is one of how best to balance the 
respective strengths and limitations of government 
and private sector so that they complement each other 
to the maximum advantage of the nation as a whole. 
In this area, the Botswana government will adopt the 
approach of first identifying and analysing the nature 
of the problems and then selecting from various 
policy options those which seem more likely to solve 
them - preferably without generating a whole new set 
of problems in the process. 
There is a need to first monitor the activities and 
measure the performance of public enterprises and, in 
some cases, of particular components of such 
enterprises. Having identified the scope for improving 
productivity and enhancing efficiency and 
effectiveness, the next stage would then be to 
determine whether and how selected features of 
private enterprise could be introduced so as to achieve 
better results. This may take the form of introducing 
greater competition into areas previously served by 
entrenched monopolies, or it may take the form of 
selling to the private sector some peripheral activities 
of government or public corporations, or it may entail 
the establishment of commercially determined 
performance targets for public enterprises. In 
considering commercialisation and possible 
privatisation of some public enterprises, the 
government will move cautiously and pragmatically. 
Botswana is in a position to learn from the experience 
of others to avoid their mistakes. For example, we 
can learn about what happens when a public 
monopoly is transferred into private ownership 
without proper safeguards for the consumer, that 
commercialisation may result in the discontinuation of 
loss-making services but if those services meet vital 
social needs, special measures must be taken to 
safeguard the interest of those affected. We should 
identify those areas where private markets are simply 
impractical and there is a genuine case for public 
provision. There are so many interesting aspects of 
this debate which must be developed. 
Understanding Privatisation 
The first session of the seminar focused on answering 
three basic questions: What is privatisation? How to 
privatise successfully? and why privatise? 
What is it and how to do it? 
In addressing the first two questions, Dr. Abdalla 
Gergis, Senior Research Fellow at BIDPA, first 
remarked that despite a slow beginning in the 1980s, 
the pace of privatisation appears to have accelerated 
during the 1990s. Experience has shown that the main 
challenge for governments pursuing privatisation is to 
manage the transformation process efficiently. 
To start, the issue of privatisation must be well 
defined. The verb "to privatise" has been used to 
describe the action of making something private, or 
giving control of something to the private sector of the 
economy which has been controlled by the public 
sector. Privatisation can thus mean many different 
things. It may be used to refer to: 
• the transfer of ownership from the public to 
the private sector through the sale of all or 
some of the assets of public enterprises (PEs) 
or other public entities - often termed 
divestiture to distinguish it from other forms 
of privatisation; 
• the leasing of such assets while maintaining 
public ownership; 
• the transfer of management of public entities 
(without transfer of ownership) to the private 
sector through management contracts; 
• contracting out (out-sourcing) of public 
services to the private sector; involving 
private suppliers in activities previously 
provided by the state; 
• deregulation and liberalisation of entry into 
activities previously restricted to public 
sector entrepreneurs and removal of 
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constraints imposed upon competition 
against public enterprises. 
While the reasons for privatising PEs differ from one 
country to another, among the objectives of 
privatisation that have often been cited in 
privatisation programmes are: 
• relieving the financial and administrative 
burden of the Government in undertaking 
and maintaining a constantly expanding 
network of services and investments in 
infrastructure; 
• promoting competition, improving efficiency 
and increasing the productivity of 
enterprises; 
• accelerating the rate of economic growth by 
stimulating enterpreneurship and investment; 
• reducing the size of the public sector, with its 
monopolistic tendencies and bureaucratic 
support, in the economy; 
• increasing popular participation in the 
ownership of national assets (democratising 
ownership); 
• increasing government revenues and 
reducing budget deficits; 
• developing capital markets. 
These goals may and often do conflict Thus, a 
strategic Government task is to balance conflicting 
objectives. Clarity of objectives is especially 
important for success of privatisation efforts. The 
overriding goal, however, should be efficiency 
enhancement and promotion of competition. 
While managing privatisation is a complex task, 
lessons of world experience provide guiding 
principles to improve its implementation in countries 
which are new to the experiment 
Potential benefits and costs of privatisation must 
be critically examined and evaluated. Privatisation 
plans should identify ways to overcome or mitigate 
the worst potential impacts of privatisation and 
structural transformation and to support and reinforce 
positive outcomes. 
Having determined privatisation goals and prospects, 
a privatisation plan should be developed clearly 
stating the scope, magnitude and procedures for 
privatisation. It should also identify the privatisation 
agency and its responsibilities and how institutions 
will be developed to support implementation. 
Privatisation requires a managerial set-up that ensures 
speed, transparency and consistency of 
implementation. This entails developing a strategy 
for managing the programme and choosing the 
appropriate methods of privatisation. The strategy 
should also consider ways in which the government 
and the private sector will: 
• provide a clear direction for privatisation and 
link it with broader structural and sectoral 
reforms; 
• establish and sustain high-level political 
commitment to privatisation and supportive 
structural reforms; 
• assist implementing institutions and 
participating organisations in developing the 
capacities to carry out changes effectively. 
These institutions include government 
agencies, labour unions, investors, PEs, 
legislators, business leaders and consultants; 
• gain the co-operation of important 
stakeholders to overcome resistance to 
change and build coalition of support for 
reform. 
The choice of privatisation method depends on 
several factors including the objectives of the 
government; the financial condition and performance 
record of the PE; and the ability to mobilise private 
sector resources, particularly through the domestic 
capital market Different methods of privatisation 
result in different outcomes. 
If privatising ownership is the objective, the following 
are the most common modes of enterprise divestiture: 
• de-nationalisation or returning enterprises to 
former private owners; 
• reorganisation of an enterprise into separate 
entities or into a holding company and 
several subsidiaries in preparation for selling: 
• offering shares on the stock market to the 
public at large (emphasising widespread 
distribution of ownership or "popular 
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capitalism") or to domestic and foreign 
investors; 
• direct or private sales of enterprises or shares 
to domestic and/or foreign investors; 
• management and/or employee buy-outs; and 
• liquidation of PEs by dissolving their 
business completely. 
If divestiture is not the immediate goal of 
privatisation, or privatisation of ownership is not 
politically feasible, and the goal is to transfer 
management and operations to the private sector while 
maintaining public ownership, then the following 
methods could be used: 
• out-sourcing or franchising production, or 
provision of services needed by the 
Government, to private firms; 
• contracting with private firms to manage the 
operations or lease the business of the public 
enterprise; 
• partnerships between public and private 
companies for provision of public services, 
infrastructure and other projects. 
If the goal is to restructure PEs and make them run 
like private firms without transfer of ownership or 
management control to the private sector, then the 
most appropriate method is: 
• commercialisation of activities by 
eliminating subsidies to PEs and requiring 
cost recovery for public agencies, eliminating 
their monopoly status and requiring them to 
follow the same rules as private firms in their 
commercial activities. 
If the objective is to reduce or eliminate the public 
sector role in providing goods and services and 
promote competition by encouraging private sector 
provision, methods may include 
• deregulation and liberalisation of activities, 
and removal of price controls and barriers to 
entry; and 
• government incentives for the private sector 
and NGOs to provide public services. 
Clearly, each of these methods has its advantages and 
disadvantages that may be affected by political, 
economic and social conditions. 
Privatisation involves a lot of contractual 
arrangements and monitoring mechanisms which 
require strong institutional capacity. A strong 
institutional capacity means the capacity of 
Government to design and implement credible 
contracts that promote sustainable growth with both 
public and private agents. Successful contracting 
depends on reasonably stable rules of the game, 
reliable information for monitoring, incentives for the 
principal and agent to adhere to the contract and 
mechanisms to resolve conflicts. The challenge is 
therefore to examine the adequacy of existing 
institutional capacity to implement the privatisation 
policy. Institutional weaknesses should be identified 
and amended and care must be taken in choosing 
activities to be privatised and methods of privatisation 
accordingly. 
It is essential that governments move quickly to 
strengthen institutional capacities to facilitate 
privatisation. These include 
• programmes to foster and support an 
effective system of property rights, financial 
institutions, labour markets, legal institutions 
that can legitimise business transactions and 
adjudicate or resolve business conflicts 
effectively, and marketing and distribution 
channels. 
• programmes to accelerate private sector 
development by providing incentives and 
support for developing small and 
medium-sized enterprises, restructuring large 
companies and attracting foreign investment 
Procedures must be developed to carry out the 
transformation process in an effective manner. This 
entails redefinition of government's role in economic 
activities from controlling and producing to 
facilitating and regulating. The redefinition of the role 
and responsibilities of Government implies a 
restructuring of activities and procedures. 
During the implementation of privatisation, 
Governments must pay special attention to protecting 
the interests of workers who will be displaced by 
restructuring and divestiture of PEs, providing 
training, employment and social assistance, and health 
insurance for those in transition from one job to 
another while they are unemployed and social security 
for those who are retiring. Employee ownership 
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schemes can be used to elicit support for privatisation; 
research shows that they can also enhance 
productivity, although profit sharing and bonus 
schemes are more powerful incentives. 
Transparency must obtain in every privatisation 
transaction. The larger and more visible the 
transaction, and the less competitive the market for 
the enterprise's goods or services, the greater the 
importance of transparency. Not only transparency 
has to be emphasised but it has also to be publicised. 
Privatisation has many enemies, and together, they 
pose a formidable challenge to its supporters. In 
designing a privatisation programme, government 
should therefore take into account the potential 
obstacles that can undermine or complicate the 
management and implementation of the privatisation 
process. 
Three important factors contribute to privatisation 
success; privatisation agency conditions, country 
conditions and enterprise market conditions. In order 
for the privatisation agency to be successful in 
carrying out its task, it should have a strong political 
backing and high degree of financial and managerial 
autonomy. The Government must create mechanisms 
to guarantee the agency's financial accountability, 
assure transparency of its procedures and encourage 
private sector participation in the privatisation process 
to protect the public interest 
Country conditions are determined by the overall 
macroeconomic policy framework and the capacity to 
regulate. Privatisation will yield more immediate and 
greater benefits the more market-friendly the overall 
policy environment For example, the outlook for 
undertaking privatisation in an uncertain environment 
characterised by high inflation is poor, for the same 
reasons that private sector investment tends, under the 
same circumstances, to be dormant - prices lose their 
ability to transmit signals that improve the allocation 
of resources. Privatisation would therefore be more 
successful if it were part of an overall policy reform 
programme that induces greater competition, both 
domestic and international, and macroeconomic 
stability. 
A well functioning legal framework is also very 
important for successful privatisation since 
privatisation of enterprises operating in 
non-competitive markets requires that a regulatory 
system be in place to protect consumers. The 
privatisation process is also easier if the enterprise is 
operating in a competitive or potentially competitive 
market and the environment is market-friendly. For 
enterprises operating in non-competitive markets, the 
process is more difficult especially where capital 
markets are thin as is the case in poor countries. 
In order to draw a road map for public enterprise 
reform for a country like Botswana, the first question 
to ask is whether Botswana's public enterprises need 
reform. If the answer is yes, the next question would 
be whether Botswana is ready for such reform. If no t 
enhance readiness by creating the necessary 
environment as discussed earlier, if yes, then do 
enterprise level analysis identifying problem areas. 
For the enterprise under investigation, market 
conditions must be examined; whether competitive, 
potentially competitive or monopolistic. In the case of 
competitive or potentially competitive markets, 
transparency needs to be ensured in privatisation 
transactions if divestiture is possible. In the case of 
monopolies, adequate regulations must be in place if 
divestiture is possible and desirable. If divestiture is 
not desirable or not possible, contractual arrangements 
with the private sector should be considered- If 
contractual arrangements are not possible, other 
public enterprise reform measures would be needed. 
These include un-bundling large firms, encouraging 
competition, elimination of subsidies and transfers, 
restricting soft credit ensuring managerial and 
financial autonomy, and finally using performance 
contracts. 
In conclusion, privatisation is neither a panacea for 
public sector ills nor sufficient to ensure economic 
efficiency. Generating improvements in enterprise 
performance involves much more than simply a 
change in ownership through divestiture. Bringing 
about improvements in the performance of enterprises 
is not just a question of economics, but also involves 
issues of organisation, institutional building and 
political will. 
In the final analysis, privatisation is just one facet of 
the larger policy issue of PE reform and private sector 
development Its contribution should be seen as 
helping to further this development as countries 
attempt to adjust towards more efficient and 
sustainable growth-oriented economies. Political 
commitment to encourage the expansion of the private 
sector as an instrument of economic and social 
development is therefore essential to the success of 
privatisation policy. 
The case for privatisation rests less on fine-tuning the 
net benefits and more on a vision of changes in the 
roles of the public and private sectors as well as in the 
particular sector in which the enterprises selected for 
privatisation operate. For this to occur, privatisation 
must take place within a macroeconomic and sectoral 
environment that induces greater competition, both 
10 
COMPETITION. PRODUCTIVITY & PRIVATISATION BIPPA 
domestic and international. Unless effective 
competition and/or regulation are introduced, the 
privatisation of firms with market power brings about 
private ownership in precisely the circumstances 
where it has least to offer. 
Clear privatisation objectives and strategy are 
essential for success. This involves identifying and 
resolving policy trade-offs; establishing the 
appropriate scope, pace and sequencing of 
privatisation and choosing the right privatisation 
methods. Implementation involves decisions on 
restructuring PEs prior to sale, pricing of assets and 
shares, financing of sales and the institutional 
machinery for managing privatisation. 
Why privatise? 
Answering this question, Mr. Mike Bazett of 
Coopers & Lybrand, stated that privatisation is 
simply one of many performance improvement tools. 
As such it should be selected for use in order to 
address a specific problem to deliver specific 
objectives. The gap between where you are now and 
where you want to be defines the problem you are 
trying to solve. However, as privatisation is a single 
tool among many, it may or may not be the right tool 
for overcoming the problem. 
Many public sector organisations around the world 
can be described as: 
• acting as the dead hand of government; 
• politically influenced; 
• having too many staff; 
• monopolistic; and 
• having under motivated, inefficient staff with 
poorly defined and confused incentives. 
As a result, these organisations: 
• are often loss-making; 
• have a poor image; and 
• provide inadequate services with inadequate 
quality at high cost to the tax payer and 
customer. 
The vision for many public sector organisations is to 
provide quality goods and services, have a good 
image and possibly, depending upon the area, to be 
profitable. To achieve this vision a government 
department, agency or parastatal may wish to become: 
• commercially managed; 
• uninfluenced by politicians; 
• with sufficient staff; 
• competitive; and 
• with motivated, efficient staff with clear, 
strong incentives. 
Having seen where the public sector often is and 
where we want it to be, we now need to review what 
privatisation can deliver. 
Typical privatisation objectives include: 
• increased efficiency and effectiveness of the 
public service; 
• funds for government; 
• improved service quality; 
• reduced borrowing for government; 
• developed or strengthened capital markets 
and extended domestic share ownership; 
• elimination of loss makers and subsidies; and 
• raised international profile of the country, 
attracting foreign capital and expertise. 
Whether privatisation always works is hard to 
prove from anecdotal evidence. However, it should be 
noted that by 1997, the majority of the world's 
governments had initiated some privatisation and 
some such as the UK, New Zealand, Chile, Mexico 
and Argentina had implemented substantial 
programmes. 
Botswana's vision 2016 clearly sets out where 
Botswana wants to be. To achieve these visionary 
goals, two linked elements have been clearly 
articulated in the National Development Plan 8. First, 
diversification of the economy. Second, 
improvements in productivity. 
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A strategy to help move Botswana towards its vision 
and overcome some of its problems has been put 
forward by the Botswana National Productivity 
Centre. This strategy contains three key elements: 
• A radical reform of the public sector to 
improve its efficiency, improve its services to 
customers and to reduce its size. This will 
enable government to concentrate upon its 
core business only, and free up skilled and 
experienced labour to drive the private 
sector. 
• Focus on small and medium enterprises to 
build up the private sector and create 
employment. 
• Improve customer service. 
To bring about these three changes requires a 
comprehensive performance improvement strategy. 
It is clear from the previous discussions that 
privatisation as a policy that pervades government 
thinking can form one important element of this 
strategy. However it would be one tool amongst many 
that the Government should employ. 
Many countries have been forced into privatisation 
programmes by IMF or World Bank officials due to 
financial pressures. Botswana is in the privileged 
position of not requiring urgent additional funds. This 
does mean that Batswana have the opportunity to 
carefully review the present position, their desired 
position and consider what role privatisation should 
play. The disadvantage for Botswana is that the lack 
of urgency may result in delay. There is an 
opportunity to move to the next phase of Botswana's 
development but a tremendous amount of work and 
careful planning is required. The danger for Botswana 
is that today will always be for discussion and 
tomorrow for action. 
There are five broad messages of this presentation: 
• Remember the tax paver and customer. 
While constructing and implementing a 
privatisation programme, do not lose sight of 
the tax payer and the customer of public 
goods and services. 
• Privatisation is complex, it is not a panacea 
or a single event Seek advice from those 
who have passed this way before and learn 
from their mistakes. 
• Privatisation can be a remarkably powerful 
tool to improve efficiency and effectiveness 
and produce higher quality goods and 
services at lower cost. 
• It is difficult to prove that privatisation works 
but a great deal of evidence points that way. 
• Privatisation appears to be a useful tool that 
Botswana could use to help improve its 
productivity and assist with its diversification 
to achieve sustainable development 
Institutional Framework For 
Privatisation 
The institutional environment for privatisation 
requires: 
• Creating an enabling legal and regulatory 
framework. 
• Financial sector reform 
• Corporate governance 
Creating an enabling legal and regulatory 
framework 
In addressing this issue. Dr. Kofi Date-Bab (Legal 
Advisor at the Commonwealth Secretariat) stated 
that, as part of the privatisation process, it is prudent 
for governments to review commercial and business 
laws with a view to identifying any weaknesses in 
their enabling and regulatory functions so that the 
appropriate remedial action can be taken. Among the 
laws that will require review are those relating to 
ownership and transfer of immovable commercial 
property; the prerogatives of the state in determining 
the use of land; environmental protection; types, 
formation, organisation and limited liability of 
companies; various types of commercial contracts; 
intellectual property; securities and stock markets; 
banking and financial services; the fiscal regime; 
competition and restrictive business practices; 
insolvency; labour law; accounting and accounting 
standards; and procedures for settlement of disputes. 
It is not essential to enact specific legislation to 
facilitate the implementation of the privatisation 
programme, but such a legislation is often useful in 
focusing the minds of those in charge of the 
programme on the critical issues. Some of these issues 
relate to the route of establishing a privatisation 
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agency. Such an agency may be established 
administratively or by a statute. 
The decision to adopt the route of establishing a 
privatisation agency by statute implies early resort to 
the legislature in the privatisation process. The statute 
enables the authority of the agency to be explicitly 
and transparently set out so that prospective investors 
know exactly where to stand in relation to it. 
Because most privatisation programmes of any 
significant size will find resorting to public issues of 
securities useful, an enabling and regulatory 
framework for securities is usually essential for 
developing and/or strengthening the domestic capital 
market Where no regulatory system exists for 
securities, steps will need to be taken to put one in 
place as part of the mechanics of the privatisation 
process. 
Among the objectives of government regulation of 
the securities market are: 
• the protection of investors from fraud, 
dishonesty and unfair practices; 
• ensuring that market operations in securities 
measure up to the rules of the market place; 
and 
• enforcing particular public policy objectives. 
These objectives are compatible with varying degrees 
of self-regulation, depending upon national 
circumstances. Self-regulation is often effective since 
the governing body of a stock exchange or other 
securities market is usually a repository of special 
expertise and likely to have greater insight into the 
daily operations of the market than any government 
body. 
Given the need for both a degree of self-regulation 
and of regulation by Governments, the critical issue is 
how to structure a regime of co-regulation which is 
balanced and allows efficient market operations 
without undue government interference but at the 
same time enables Government intervention to protect 
the public interest 
In Botswana, a legal infrastructure for the regulation 
of securities exists, which makes the public issue of 
securities available as one of the privatisation 
techniques on offer. The Botswana legislature has 
formulated a regulatory framework for securities 
which is contained in the Botswana Stock Exchange 
Act 1994 which established the Botswana Stock 
Exchange (BSE) as a corporate body. The Act 
provides for the affairs of BSE to be managed and 
controlled by a committee. It also provides for the 
appointment of a Registrar to establish the Register of 
Stockbrokers. Regulatory authority over the securities 
industry in Botswana is shared between this registrar, 
the Committee of the BSE and the Minister of Finance 
and Development Planning. 
The Botswana Stock Exchange Act came into force at 
the end of October 1995 at the same time as the 
publication of regulations made under it to give the 
BSE operational guidance. Currently only one 
stockbroker has been licensed under the Act and as of 
February 1996, there were 12 listed companies on the 
BSE with a market capitalisation of US $ 395 million. 
An issue which may be worth considering in relation 
to privatisation in Botswana is whether the 
Government should initiate movement towards more 
self-regulation by the BSE and, if so within what time 
frame. 
Public policy issues involving anti-competitive 
practices need to be considered in relation to the 
privatisation process. This is because once a public 
enterprise has been privatised, its subsequent 
behaviour as well as the behaviour of other private 
sector business units in relation to mergers and 
acquisitions needs to be within the regulatory 
framework addressing critical issues in this area. 
Measures and institutions to regulate anti-competitive 
behaviour of firms need to be in place. 
There are two levels of regulatory need: first there is 
the need for regulatory control to ensure that mergers 
and acquisitions or privatisation activities do not result 
in anti-competitive effects, or other effects that may 
be otherwise against the public interest. Secondly, 
there is the regulatory need to foster investor 
protection by ensuring that shareholders in target 
companies are treated fairly and equally. 
The legal steps needed to prepare an enterprise for 
privatisation will depend upon the pre-existing legal 
form of the enterprise in question. If a public 
enterprise is being run as a department of Government 
or other integral unit of the Government it will be 
necessary to "corporatise" the enterprise. In 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, this will usually mean 
turning the Government department or other such unit 
into a limited liability company. If the enterprise is 
already in the form of a limited liability company, the 
legal hurdles to its privatisation will be less, unless the 
business in question needs to be broken up into 
different units or a new regulatory framework needs 
to be put in place for its post-privatisation operation. 
Even if the enterprise is already a limited liability 
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company, the promoters in government of the 
privatisation will need to determine what legislative or 
other authorisation will be needed to enable the partial 
or total transfer of its ownership to the private sector. 
For example, if the enterprise to be privatised is a 
Government Department or a statutory corporation, 
the legal mechanics for the transfer of its assets and 
liabilities to a limited liability company will need to 
be worked out. 
The need for regulation arises when there is no 
genuine competition, or when a privatised firm is 
likely to enjoy monopoly power as is the case when 
public utilities are privatised. 
The legal and institutional framework for regulating 
particular privatised utilities will depend on the kind 
of regulation chosen by Government. For instance, 
the rate of return regulation of a privatised utility 
will imply ordinarily the establishment of a tribunal to 
serve as a forum for proceedings to determine the 
enterprise's costs, revenues and rate of return. This 
form of regulation is usual in the USA, Canada, the 
Caribbean and elsewhere. It allows the enterprise in 
question to set prices such that, over a defined period, 
a maximum rate of return on capital (or some other 
measure of assets employed) can be earned, but no 
more. It requires the regulatory body to judge, often in 
a judicial or quasi-judicial manner, the appropriate 
rate of return, to measure the capital base and 
allowable expenses, as well as revenues. The 
regulatory burden of this system is quite heavy since 
the accounting system of the whole business has to be 
virtually replicated and monitored by the regulatory 
body. 
Price index regulation for monopoly services is an 
alternative regulatory system pioneered in the UK. 
This form of regulation provides that the maximum 
overall price increase for a basket of monopoly 
services that have been identified shall be limited by 
reference to a specified criterion. This criterion might 
be the movement in an index of the cost of living or of 
industrial costs. In the UK, the Retail Price Index has 
been used. The system operates as a price cap on the 
general level of consumer prices for the services in 
question. If the capping formula is set for reasonably 
long periods of, for instance, four or five years, the 
impact of it on the privatised utility is to set it as an 
efficiency target. If the company is able to reduce 
costs, its profitability will be enhanced. This kind of 
regulation is not predicated on the establishment of a 
quasi-judicial regulator. The burden of regulation is 
lighter in this system than in rate of return regulation, 
provided that the prescribed formula serving as the 
criterion stays in place for a reasonable period of say 
four or five years before reassessment This is because 
only gross revenues need to be periodically computed. 
While the regulator will still monitor investment and 
costs, its policing of the price cap would not depend 
upon these difficult assessments. The legal and 
institutional framework needed to give effect to such a 
regulatory system would differ from that needed for a 
rate of return approach to regulation. 
A government which privatises its utilities will need 
to fashion regulatory institutions to police 
monopolistic pricing and other abuses associated with 
monopolies. In the African context licensing control 
of privatised utilities may be a prudent way forward. 
The licence can be a flexible instrument of regulation. 
The conditions attached to the licence can be so 
framed as to lay the necessary obligations on the 
licensee. For instance, in most African countries it 
would be unrealistic to impose a licence condition 
requiring a telephone company to provide a service to 
every customer who requests it (the so-called 
universal service obligation). However, it may be 
desirable to make the telephone company commit 
itself to undertake capital expenditure for the 
expansion of the telecommunications network 
according to a phased development plan whose 
implementation would be an enforceable obligation of 
the licence. Thus, within the framework of the licence, 
obligations tailored to fit the particular circumstances 
of the country, the industrial sector and the company 
concerned can be negotiated. It then becomes the 
obligation of the regulator to police the licence 
conditions thus negotiated. 
An issue for discussion in the African context is 
whether the regulator should be one official with a 
supporting bureaucracy, as is the practice in the U K 
or whether it should be a collegial body as is the case 
in the US, for instance, in relation to regulators such 
as the FCC. Another issue is whether the regulator 
should reach its major decisions only after public 
hearings or whether administrative consideration of 
regulatory issues, as in the U K is adequate. These are 
issues which may need to be resolved differently in 
different countries. Also for consideration is whether 
in the context of African economies, each privatised 
monopolistic sector, such as telecommunications or 
electricity etc., should have its own dedicated 
regulator, or whether the regulatory functions for the 
different sectors can be brought under the umbrella of 
one regulator overseeing all privatised monopolies. In 
an economy where trained specialised manpower is 
scarce, it may make sense to opt for the umbrella 
regulator. Among the range of functions that such an 
umbrella regulator would carry out would be: 
• the making of recommendations to the 
Minister on the grant of licences in respect of 
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the privatised monopolies under its Among the pre-requisites for successful financial 
jurisdiction; sector reform are: 
the enforcement of licensees' obligations 
under the licence and under relevant statutes; 
strong political commitment 
interventionist policies; 
to reduce 
• tariff regulation within the terms of the 
licence or any relevant statute; 
• monitoring quality of service and prescribing 
service standards under enabling authority 
under the licence or statute; 
• acting in an advisory role to the Minister on 
policy matters relating to the privatised 
monopolies; and 
• investigation of complaints by consumers. 
Many of the decisions that a regulator will make in the 
exercise of these functions will be important ones 
requiring "due process". In other words, those affected 
or likely to be affected should be given an opportunity 
to make representations to the regulator before those 
decisions are taken, or alternatively, they should be 
allowed to challenge such decisions after they have 
been made. 
Financial Sector Reform 
Financial sector reform improves activities of the 
financial system (financial institutions, money and 
capital markets, financial instruments, and regulatory 
and supervisory systems), helps to restructure 
service-based economies, and improves the 
effectiveness of macroeconomic policy measures. 
Capita] Markets mobilise longer term savings, 
facilitate investment, improve financial efficiency by-
reducing the cost of capital, and facilitate the 
privatisation process through access to international 
capital markets. 
Following a historical review of the main issues in 
financial sector reform, Dr. Ranee Jayamaha -
Economic Advisor at the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, discussed the objectives of financial 
sector reform (FSR) emphasising its importance in 
integrating segmented money and capital markets, 
creating competitive markets and contributing to 
successful privatisation by enabling the private sector 
to play a leading role in economic development and 
helping to breakdown the inertia about state 
ownership. 
• reasonably conducive macroeconomic 
environment and expanded scope for formal 
financial sector activity; 
• financial repair: elimination of weak 
financial conditions of state-owned 
institutions arisen due to inappropriate cash 
management, conflict of interest over 
ownership, outmoded technologies and 
financial services, over-staffing and high 
administrative costs; 
• realistic and moderately stable relative 
structures of prices; prices should generally 
not be very different from world prices; 
• realistic levels of interest rates: stimulate 
adequate savings while avoiding 
disincentives to investments and capital 
market development; 
• strong financial structures: removal of 
administrative controls and establishment of 
appropriate supervisory and regulatory 
framework; 
• greater awareness of the need for reform by 
the public and the need to obtain outside 
support (technical assistance from donor 
agencies) and private sector co-operation; 
and 
• appropriate timing of reform and adequate 
human and managerial capacity. 
If these pre-conditions (fiscal discipline and 
macroeconomic stability) are not satisfied, financial 
sector reform will result in high interest rates as 
experienced by many countries; Chile and Turkey in 
the 1980s, for example. 
The scope of financial sector reform extends to 
include 
• establishing market oriented interest rates 
and removing financial repression (all Latin 
American countries, Korea, Indonesia, 
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Thailand set market oriented interest rates at 
the beginning of FSR); 
• restructuring of insolvent institutions through 
government initiation or leaving banks 
themselves to solve problems; 
• increasing competition in the financial 
system: within the banking sector, between 
banking and non-banking financial 
institutions; between money and capital 
markets; and equity markets and captive 
sources of funds (South Africa); 
• opening the domestic financial system to 
international capital flows, foreign direct 
investment in particular, 
• promoting debt securities markets (primary 
and secondary) and private securities 
markets; 
• changing structure and operations of the 
financial sector and avoiding market failures; 
• improving bank supervision and reviewing 
legal and regulatory framework for bank and 
non-bank financial institutions; 
• improving accounting, auditing and reporting 
standards; 
• improving payment and clearing systems; 
• improving debt recovery procedures; and 
• linking financial sector reform to other 
reforms. 
It is difficult to isolate the impact of financial sector 
reform on capital market and privatisation because 
financial sector reform has been carried out 
simultaneously with other policy changes and 
reforms. However, evidence indicates that it 
• helps to sustain high savings rates (New 
Zealand, Malaysia) and improve financial 
services; 
• establishes confidence in capital market 
transactions; enhances long term finance for 
enterprises; attracts foreign investment and 
provides new avenues for deficit financing; 
• introduces sophistication to capital market 
transactions through securities trading, 
clearing and settlement systems; 
• guides and leads liberalisation of capital 
accounts; and 
• helps to diagnose enterprise financial / 
management problems. 
The implementation of financial sector reform 
requires political commitments to pursue the reform 
policies, in particular decisions to close down 
loss-making institutions or to reform them. 
The choice between rapid and gradual / phased 
financial sector reform depends upon country 
conditions. If there is financial repression, the issue is 
whether the country can live with it and for how long 
can reforms be postponed? Countries which had a 
relatively developed institutional set-up have adopted 
a "big bang" approach (New Zealand in 1984/85 and 
UK 1986). Countries which had continuously high 
savings rates (Japan and Korea) and most countries in 
Asia adopted a gradual/phased approach. Rapid 
reform without appropriate pre-conditions can lead to 
undesirable consequences (Latin America). The nature 
of markets (i.e. the intensity of the existence of 
unofficial/informal market); the state owned financial 
sector being very large (war-torn and highly repressed 
economies e.g. Sierra Leone and Mozambique) cannot 
continue to postpone financial sector reform for very 
long. In Asia and the Caribbean, reforms were 
considered to be a process. In Africa the process has 
just begun and Uganda appears to be in the lead. 
Kenya too is adopting a gradual method 
Financial liberalisation has been most successful in 
environments in which macroeconomic stability is 
established. Almost all Commonwealth countries have 
attempted to establish macroeconomic stability prior 
to deregulation of exchange controls. Many of them, 
first, liberalised their current accounts and then the 
capital accounts. 
Most financial sector reforms, world over, have been 
initiated by central banks and in some cases by 
ministries of finance. The experience indicates that the 
guardian of the financial system has to be in the centre 
of financial sector reform, not only as a regulatory 
authority but also to maintain macro stability and a 
credible financial system. The deepening and 
modernisation of capital markets do not always 
happen automatically. They must be helped by 
co-ordinated policy effort. 
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Corporate Governance 
A sufficient institutional framework needs to be in 
place before the privatisation process is widely 
commenced. Mr. Michael Gillibrand, 
Commercialisation Advisor at the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, explained that the fundamental issue is 
the transfer of responsibility for safeguarding public 
interests after ownership and control are transferred 
from the government to the private sector. This relates 
to the amount of trust, reliability and confidence the 
public has in the private sector to manage the affairs 
of public services which are transferred from the 
public sector to be provided by the private sector. 
• Competition: Market forces, competition 
policy and monopolies commission. 
• The Regulator Sectoral or general regulator, 
which is a proxy for competition. 
• Standards and Specifications: Product and 
quality standards. 
• Established Practices of Good Management: 
Experience and reputation of private sector 
management 
• Ultimate Sanction of Parliamentary 
Questions and Enquiry: Investigative role of 
MPs. 
However, experience in both the OECD and 
developing countries has demonstrated that these 
institutions are not always in place, nor extensive 
enough, nor up-to-date, nor swift enough, nor 
sufficient for the special cases of privatised 
organisations with a high degree of public interest; 
• most developing countries lack many of 
these basic institutions, whereas 
• OECD countries have renewed debates on 
Corporate Governance. 
There is no single definition of Corporate 
Governance nor clear consensus about what it means. 
However, the objectives of Corporate Governance 
encompass: 
• Creation of wealth through ensuring efficient 
management for shareholders, management 
staff and stakeholders. 
• Compliance with the law. 
Prevention of abuse (leading to promotion of 
best practice) 
Promotion of company and country 
competitiveness. 
Promotion of good corporate citizenship 
(known as Corporate Community Investment 
in the UK and Business Partnerships in the 
US). 
The functions of Corporate Governance encompass: 
• The duty of care of the Chairperson and the 
Board. 
• Supervision of the management team. 
• Overview of the internal structures and 
relationships of the enterprise. 
Overview of the external operational 
relationships of the enterprise (customers and 
suppliers). 
• Management of the public and civic 
responsibilities and relationships of the 
enterprise with shareholders, the public 
interest (however defined), the host 
community, the government and the 
environment 
The key issues of Corporate Governance in the 
privatisation process which are subject to debate are 
the range of responsibilities, the extent and the degree 
of duty of care of the Board of Directors of a company 
to the shareholder / stakeholder. What should these 
be? Should they be primacy to the shareholders with 
basic standards of health and safety for the staff and 
customers, and social contribution maintained through 
taxation, as set by government through law and 
Conventional assumptions are that public interests and 
consumer interests are safeguarded sufficiently by a 
combination of legal, institutional and economic 
forces. These include 
• Laws: Company law, trading laws, contract 
law and criminal laws. 
• Free Press and Media: Scope for public 
complaints in the press and role of 
investigative journalism. 
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regulation? What are appropriate benefits to 
management/executive directors? Should recognition 
be given to a limited group stakeholders 
(shareholders, staff, customers), a wider group of 
stakeholders (shareholders, staff, customers, suppliers, 
host community), extended stakeholders with many 
public interests (environment, national development 
interests, social welfare) or international as well as 
national public interests? Who should set these 
principles and standards for the Boards of Directors or 
markets? (the government through legislation? the 
government through board representation? the 
government through contractual forms (contract of 
sale to private owners, or performance contracts)? 
self-governing institutions for sectoral or national 
operations? independent (un-elected) regulators? 
professional institutions? the companies themselves? 
The private sector institutional infrastructure extends 
far beyond the basic pre-requisites of company and 
contract law, regulator, and financial sector laws and 
regulations. The network of the private sector and 
privatisation institutions includes: 
• The enabling regulatory, legal and financial 
(banking and capital markets) framework. 
• Real market competition (or a strong 
regulator as proxy). 
• An effective investor community, willing and 
able to participate in corporate governance 
through company managers and continuous 
active shareholder interest. 
• Effective economic monitoring institutions 
and systems, in the government or 
universities or private sector, capable of 
assessing long term impacts of corporate 
behaviour. 
• Standards and Specifications Bureaux. 
• Professional Institutes of Directors and 
Management, dealing with the issues of 
corporate governance and providing director 
training. 
• Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
Associations. 
• Professional Institutes for the key service 
industries: Accounting, Banking, Law, 
Company Secretaries. 
• Non-Government organisations directly 
concerned with public interests, consumer 
welfare and corporate behaviour (Consumers 
Association, Small Shareholders 
Associations, Rotary and Lions Clubs). 
• Free Press. 
• Institutional and Political Efficacy. 
What are the implications for the managers of the 
privatisation process? 
• Establish a basic network of institutions, 
whether or not there will be transfer or 
ownership. 
• Ensure that the institutions have a sufficiency 
of deterrence. 
• Introduce training for directors in their new 
functions. 
• Open the debate on Appropriate Governance 
in the country. 
Decisions on appropriate action lie with each country 
according to the prevailing needs. Improved 
Corporate Governance is needed whether or not the 
country opts for privatisation. The main task is to 
• build capacities for corporate governance (a) 
develop management as a profession, (b) 
develop corporate directorship as a 
profession (c) establish and strengthen 
institutions to nurture a cadre of directors 
(Institute of Directors, Institute of 
Management / Business Schools, 
Professional Institutes: law, accounting, 
company secretaries) and "Business in the 
Community" societies; 
• encourage debate to form national consensus 
on good corporate governance (seminars, 
articles in journals and newspapers); and 
• Consider government incentives (tax breaks 
for community investments, adjustments to 
procurement and privatisation sale price). 
Improving Public Sector 
Performance Without Privatisation 
The performance of public sector institutions has been 
disappointing, to say the least, in many developing 
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countries. While privatisation is among the policy 
options for public sector reform, other reform 
mechanisms can also be powerful tools when properly 
implemented. 
The Tanzanian case 
For the last thirty years, the public sector in Tanzania 
has been the dominant engine of socio-economic 
development due to the socialist path the country took 
soon after independence in 1961. However, the 
country has over the past decade been steadily 
undertaking major reforms of its public sector. Mr. D. 
A. Ntukamazina, Executive Chairman of the Civil 
Service Reform Programme in Tanzania, explained 
that these reforms aimed at revitalising and improving 
the performance of public sector institutions while at 
the same time creating an enabling environment for 
the private sector to assume a leading role in 
socio-economic development. 
The basic agenda has been to streamline and downsize 
the machinery of Government, requiring a 
fundamental shift towards only doing what must be 
done by Government. Privatisation programmes are 
only a partial response to this policy shift There have 
been three major areas of reform initiatives; the Civil 
Service Reform, the Parastatal Sector Reform and the 
Financial Sector Reform. 
On financial sector reform, the Government has 
allowed private, mainly foreign, banks to operate in 
Tanzania and the existing national banks are being 
forced to restructure themselves, adopt business-like 
systems and practices, and improve performance in 
order to compete with these new banks. The 
restructuring has entailed a review of the mission and 
vision, structures, functions and management systems. 
In order to remedy the bad performance and rescue 
some of the limping parastatals, Government opted for 
privatisation through joint ventures, divestiture, 
management buyouts and complete sale. Although it 
is early to assess impact of the privatised industries on 
the performance of the economy, there are already 
some visible positive trends. 
Performance contracts are seen as the alternative 
option to privatisation of strategic parastatals. Such 
contracts are geared to ensure that these parastatals 
operate efficiently and with commercial orientation, 
especially where there are no obvious market-based 
competition pressures to improve performance i.e. die 
parastatal has monopoly status in the delivery of 
services. Under such a performance contract for 
example, the Board of Directors, management and 
employees of the parastatal and the Government 
(Parent Ministry) agree: 
• on verifiable performance improvement 
indicators, and benchmark performance at 
target levels; 
• that the management and staff would part 
with a given percentage of their regular 
salaries if set targets of services 
improvements are not met; 
• that if the performance of the parastatal falls 
below some benchmark levels, then the 
Board of Directors could be dissolved, and 
the employment of top management 
terminated. 
The major challenge with the option of performance 
contracts will be to ensure the capacity and 
commitment of the Government ministries to exercise 
the necessary surveillance and enforce the contract 
agreements. In this regard, the effective use of this 
option could depend on the successful reform of the 
civil service. 
The Civil Service Reform was sparked off by a Public 
Expenditure crisis. A joint World Bank Government 
study in 1989 on public expenditure revealed the 
nature of the crisis. The Civil Service engaged itself in 
too many functions, its structures were rigidly 
bureaucratic, die workers were frustrated and 
de-motivated by low remuneration packages while 
personnel records were in shambles. The Civil 
Service needed complete overhaul to revitalise it so 
that it could play its new role of being a catalyst and 
facilitator of the development process whose main 
engine would now be die private sector. 
The Civil Service Reform in Tanzania was officially 
launched in July 1991. In July 1993 the government 
embarked on the implementation of a comprehensive 
reform programme comprising six components, 
namely: 
(1) Organisation and Efficiency Reforms. 
(2) Pay Reform. 
(3) Personnel Control and Management. 
(4) Capacity Building. 
(5) Retrenchment and Re-deployment 
(6) Local Government Reform. 
Through the civil service reform programme, it is 
anticipated that the performance and efficiency of the 
public sector can be improved without privatising. 
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The Civil Service Reform Programme has five broad 
initiatives: 
(a) Downsizing 
(b) organisation and efficiency reviews 
(c) executive agencies programme 
(d) local government reform 
(e) changing the attitudes of civil servants. 
Downsizing 
The public expenditure crisis that prevailed in the 
early 1990s persuaded the government to start the 
reform through cost containment measures Le. 
downsizing the service through reduction of functions 
and retrenchment of surplus staff. While in 1992 the 
Civil Service establishment stood at 355,000 (i.e. both 
Central and Local Government), the retrenchment 
which started in 1992/93 has brought down the 
number to 275,000 in February 1997. That is a 
reduction of more than 20 percent of the civil service 
workforce, and net of recruitment that have continued 
in such key social service areas as education, health 
and internal security. These latter areas have been 
exempted from a total freeze on government 
employment which was imposed in 1992. 
Organisational and Efficiency Reforms 
The Organisation and Efficiency Reforms (O&E) aim 
at streamlining ministerial structures, rationalisation 
of functions and systems and the hive-off of functions 
that are not core to the functioning of government 
The guiding policy and principle for the O&E reforms 
is the government decision to withdraw from direct 
production and direct delivery of services. 
Executive Agencies Programme 
By mid-1994, the Government decided to re-designate 
eleven central Government organisations as 
"Executive Agencies". These agencies were selected 
on the basis of their potential to generate revenue, 
either by trading, or by charging fees for the services 
they provide. By way of example, they included the 
Registrar of Companies, the Government Printer, the 
Central Medical Stores and the Directorate of Civil 
Aviation. 
This allows large departments performing public 
functions to be broken down into manageable units in 
which the role and objectives are much clearer. 
Executive Agencies are Government organisations 
established to perform essential public functions that 
do not have to be carried out by the central 
management of Government Ministries. The aim has 
been to reduce the interference with the operational 
aspects of service delivery, thereby creating an 
environment where accountability can be made to 
work, and enhancing job satisfaction, motivation, and 
therefore performance. 
This involves giving agencies autonomy from the 
central civil service bureaucracy, particularly with 
respect to the control of their personnel and financial 
resources. This will allow them to decide how to 
manage their operations to meet their objectives; i. e. 
become output rather than input focused. 
Agencies will become more business-like in 
operation. In particular they will need to be more 
"customer focused"; install and use modern 
management systems and methods, including business 
planning, commercial style financial accounting, 
systematic measurement of output performance, and 
deliberately seeking feedback from customers and 
other stakeholders. 
Agencies will be headed by Chief Executives who 
will be recruited by open competition. This will not 
only introduce transparency to the appointment 
process, but also widen the pool from which selection 
can be made. This improves the prospect of finding 
'the best person for the job'. Chief Executives will be 
employed on term contracts, with duration of up to 
five years. 
Principal Secretaries will be charged with the strategic 
management of the agencies under their ministries, 
and with advising their ministers on the acceptability 
of agency performance. To assist diem in this role, 
advisory boards, comprising a few of the agency's 
main stakeholders, will be set up. These boards will 
be as small as possible, should include private sector 
representation, and in normal circumstances meet two 
or three times per year to consider policy, plans and 
budgets, and to review performance. Members of the 
board would also be involved in Chief Executive 
selection. 
The staff of these Agencies will form a new category 
of public servant and therefore be outside the civil 
service. This will simplify the process of allowing 
Agencies to introduce terms and conditions of service 
specifically designed to meet their needs. 
Agencies will be allowed to exploit their new 
commercial approach in managing their business, by 
(where appropriate) competing with the private sector. 
Proper financial management will be essential for the 
agency concept to succeed. As government Agencies, 
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their accounts will be audited by the Office of the 
Controller and Auditor General whose report will be 
published alongside the agency's annual report and 
accounts, and be made available to Parliament's Public 
Accounts Committee. 
Although the early agencies had difficulties 
establishing themselves, some significant 
improvements have been realised. For example, in its 
second year of operations as an Agency (1995/96), the 
Directorate of Civil Aviation exceeded an independent 
forecast of revenue by 77% (or TSh 1.3 billion). The 
Registrar of Companies has achieved an average 
increase in its surplus (revenue minus expenditure) of 
20% and forecasts the same for next year. In its first 
half year of operations the Tanzania Revenue 
Authority exceeded its tax collection performance 
targets by 5% on the mainland and 10% in Zanzibar. 
Compared with the same period of the previous year 
the improvements were 40% and 64% respectively. 
BIDPA 
autonomous institutions with more resources 
including finance and stafT. 
The Regional Administration in Tanzania is being 
significantly trimmed through a reduction in 
functions, staff and assets. It will no longer involve 
itself in actual implementation. It will, instead, 
facilitate service delivery by the local authorities. 
The newly adopted local government reform agenda 
has six main reform components: 
• Institutional and legal framework. 
• Restructuring of local authorities. 
• Improving governance. 
• Strengthening financial management. 
These and similar improvements elsewhere are 
attributed, at least in part, to changes in attitude 
through the motivational effect of working in an 
organisation that has more control over its financial 
affairs. Staff feel that revenue collected is not just 
being swallowed up by an ever hungrier Treasury, but 
will be applied to improve their organisation, and 
eventually feed through into better pay and 
conditions. Management also deserve credit for 
improving their systems of monitoring and control, 
again a shift in attitude, this time towards taking more 
care because more attention is focused on their 
personal contribution to the organisation's 
performance. 
Local Government Reform 
The local government reform also promises to 
improve performance in service delivery without 
privatising. 
The present local government system is just an 
appendix of the central government It depends on the 
government for most of its resources. It has been 
assigned critical responsibilities like overseeing 
primary education and primary health but without a 
corresponding revenue base. The central government 
through the Prime Minister's Office makes the major 
decisions for local authorities. 
The new Local Government Reform Agenda aims at 
strengthening local authorities and reversing the 
present situation by making Local Authorities largely 
• Human resources development and 
management 
• Programme management 
The reform agenda aims at improving the 
performance of the Local Authorities through: 
• making local authorities more autonomous in 
managing their administrative, personnel and 
financial affairs and determining their own 
priorities; 
• making the local authorities operate in a 
more transparent and democratic manner 
reflecting enhanced accountability to the 
people they are supposed to serve; 
• making the staff responsible and accountable 
to their councils in terms of appointment 
performance and discipline; 
• enhancing the capacity of the councils in 
terms of staff who are better trained in 
relevant skills; 
• enabling the local authorities to have more 
financial resources through the 
rationalisation of the revenue base and more 
grants from the government and the donors. 
In addition to the above efforts the government has 
already adopted the shared vision for local 
government which is decentralisation by devolution 
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i.e. giving full powers and authority to the local 
authorities to manage their own affairs. 
Changes in the Attitudes of Civil Servants 
Civil servants are being exhorted to operate and 
manage public affairs in a businesslike manner. Also, 
they are constantly being reminded of their new role, 
i.e. that of a facilitator of the private sector. They are 
being challenged to create an enabling environment 
for the private sector to operate smoothly. They are 
urged to know who is their customer and to strive to 
satisfy him or her. The aim is to build a 
results-oriented managerial culture in the Civil 
Service. 
Concluding Remarks 
Improving individual and collective performance 
requires changing peoples' attitudes and values, 
together with a complete overhaul of management 
systems. In Tanzania, we have identified the 
problems and are developing strategies to overcome 
them. These will include increasing die involvement 
of the private sector in service delivery as it continues 
to grow and mature. But in the meantime the 
initiatives described earlier to improve the 
performance of the public sector workforce must be 
used. 
The case of Singapore 
In his presentation, Mr, Lim Hup Seng, Deputy 
Secretary of the Public Services Division in 
Singapore, started by indicating that the key issues 
facing the Public Service in Singapore are how to 
meet the aspirations and demands of a generation that 
has not known difficult times, and how to position 
Singapore in a world economy that is open and highly 
competitive. Hence, the title of the presentation 
"Harnessing the Qualitivity of Staff". Qualitivity is 
simply a word coined to combine quality and 
productivity. 
The Public Service needs to anticipate demands, 
influence developments, and lead the way forward. Its 
people must have the right attitudes and the right 
approach. 
While the future cannot be predicted, we must be 
prepared for it as it comes. If systems and design were 
the value-added of the industrial revolution, creativity 
will be the value-added of the knowledge revolution. 
And if the private sector were to be the engine of 
growth built upon innovation and enterprise, the 
public sector leadership in Singapore felt that Public 
Service must appreciate and understand these 
attributes through living them. 
The question is how to organise people so that they 
will be receptive to change and how to motivate them 
so that they will involve themselves actively in the 
process. The lack of competition in public service 
activities and a public that does not know the inner 
departmental workings mean that nothing will 
improve beyond the minimum necessary to keep the 
public satisfied. 
Recognising this problem, a "Public Service for the 
21st Century" programme (PS21) was introduced in 
May 1995 to prepare the Public Service for the 
challenges ahead. PS21 has two basic objectives: 
• to nurture an attitude of service excellence in 
meeting the needs of Singaporeans with high 
standards of quality and courtesy; and 
• to foster an environment that induces and 
welcomes continuous change with 
continuous improvement while paying 
attention to the morale and well-being of 
public officers. 
There are four elements in PS21 - quality service, 
organisational review, staff well-being, and something 
called "EXCEL". 
EXCEL is an acronym standing for "Excellence 
through Continuous Enterprise and Learning". There 
are two critical components in Excel; Work 
Improvement Teams (WITs) and Staff Suggestions 
Schemes (SSS). These two components are core to the 
PS21 movement because they induce an attitude of 
seeking continuous improvement in work; and as the 
officers get involved in seeking such improvement, 
they become much more receptive to changes. 
WITs are not different from Quality Control Circles 
or QCC referred to in management literature. They are 
teams of officers who meet regularly - over and above 
their normal workload - to discuss work-related 
situations that can be improved. The common tools 
used by WITs: the PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Action) 
cycle approach, brainstorming, matrix diagram, cause 
and effect analysis (fishbone diagram), data collection 
and analysis, check sheet, graphs and charts, 
stratification, the Pareto Diagram, histogram, scatter 
diagram, force-field analysis, and method analysis are 
invaluable in helping the members understand the 
management process. While none, or only one or two, 
of these tools may be used for the first few projects 
because the solutions are so obvious, they will come 
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in useful as the teams move into problems that are 
more complicated and where solutions are not so 
obvious. The teams learn in the course of their 
discussions how to brainstorm ideas, how to handle 
varieties of opinion, how to seek solutions based on 
data, how to sort out priorities and how to build 
consensus. 
Continuous top management attention and interest is 
necessary to keep the WIT movement alive, as also 
participation in WIT Conventions and project 
presentations to management. Participation in WITS is 
not entirely voluntary; it is regarded as an integral part 
of work life. Just like assigning new employees to 
their place within the organisation structure, they are 
assigned to their WIT. If they do not wish to 
participate, they can ask to be excused, but would first 
have to listen through the reasons for the WIT 
movement so that they may make an informed 
decision. 
SSS is not unique: many organisations have staff 
suggestions schemes, but what makes SSS different is 
the approach taken in encouraging and processing the 
suggestions. This approach is based on the belief that 
an environment that encourages alertness on the part 
of staff to possibilities of improvement, no matter how 
small, is much more important Staff are unwilling to 
offer suggestions or take initiatives for improvement 
if they perceive a high chance of rejection. The bigger 
the potential improvement, the more radical an idea it 
is likely to be, and the more fearful they will be of 
rejection. So an environment that is open to 
suggestions of any shape or form is more likely to 
bring in the really big and radical ideas. 
An award is given for every sensible suggestion made. 
Most awards are at a token level of about $2. Awards 
are given based on the usefulness, implementability 
and potential cost savings of the suggestion. 
Suggestions from teams score double the awards for 
individuals. If two or more persons put in the same 
suggestion, all of them are rewarded because if so 
many people have die same idea, it is likely that the 
proposed improvement will enjoy broader support 
Good ideas must be carried through to 
implementation. If a suggestion is not taken up, the 
suggestor must be told why. If a department fails to 
ensure that suggestions are processed in timely 
fashion and results fed back early to the suggestors, 
enthusiasm will drop very fast To overcome some 
unhappiness on the part of officers who have to 
implement suggestions put in by others, some 
ministries also reward the implementor, who gets the 
same-sized award as the suggestor. 
Few people intrinsically welcome change. Change is 
discomforting and even threatening, but it is 
something management has to continually work a t 
Often the most difficult barrier is the middle level 
manager. Top management understands the need to 
change. The people at the operating level often want 
to be involved: they like to improve their work 
environment believe they know what can be done 
better, desire to take pride in their work. But they 
perceive their supervisors as not welcoming change. 
What is needed is neither bottom-up management nor 
top-down management but middle-up-down 
management where middle-level managers see the 
strategic organisational viewpoint and also appreciate 
the concerns and difficulties at the operating level, 
and actively work at building congruence in interest 
between the two levels. 
Judging from experience in Singapore, harnessing the 
qualitivity of staff seems like a good idea that can be 
successfully done. But it involves conviction, 
determination and tenacity. Top management must be 
willing to listen, supervisors must be willing to 
change, and staff at the operating level must be 
willing to trust the organisation. No officer can be 
expected to pursue productivity and quality if he 
believes it may be at the expense of his livelihood, his 
family, or his health. But getting the most out of the 
abilities of people will be well worth all the effort 
Privatising Under Public Ownership 
The Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited 
The case study of Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited was 
presented by Mr. A. S. Mandiwanza, Chief 
Executive, Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited. 
Previously known as Dairy Marketing Board, 
Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited is a Public Enterprise, 
which in July 1994 was transformed from a parastatal 
to a Commercialised company in which the 
Government of Zimbabwe is the sole shareholder. The 
Government has now approved die privatisation of 
Dairiboard. 
The Dairy Marketing Board was set up on October 1, 
1952. The main objective of the Dairy Marketing 
Board was to create an organisation that would 
facilitate: 
• the regulation and registration of all milk 
producers; 
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• the orderly reception of milk from all 
registered producers; 
• the manufacture of dairy products, and 
• the marketing of milk and dairy products. 
In the first twelve years after Independence, 
Dairiborad operated at a loss. As a result of 
government price control policies, the company sold 
its products at prices that did not allow sufficient 
recovery from the prices paid to producers. Trading 
deficits grew, forcing Dairiboard to rely on 
government subsidies for financial support. 
With the introduction of the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme in 1990 and the introduction 
of a market driven pricing structure, management was 
able to effectively manage the supply/demand 
equation. Thereafter the deficit progressively 
declined. 
The company's turn-around year was 1991/92; from 
a deficit in 1990/91 of $57 million to a near 
break-even in 1991/92. The major contributing factors 
in achieving this turn-around were related to cost 
reduction strategies such as: 
• shedding of non-core, non-profitable 
activities; 
• shedding of collection of milk from farmers 
to factories; 
• franchising of canteen and laundry services; 
• introduction of value-added products and a 
deliberate shift from primary commodity 
products; 
• automation of information systems; and 
• introduction of competitive conditions of 
service. 
In July 1994, Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited was 
commercialised, in order to sustain the viability and 
profitability of the company whilst allowing it to 
operate under the deregulated environment This was 
achieved by: 
• restructuring the Financial structure 
• focusing on the core business of 
manufacturing milk and milk based products 
• enhancing efficiency and effectiveness 
Since the transformation programme, Dairiboard 
Zimbabwe Limited has continued to operate profitably 
and registered a 13% return on sales in 1994/1995, 
completing its transformation from a subsidy 
dependent parastatal 
In October 1996, Government announced its approval 
for the Privatisation of Dairiboard Zimbabwe 
Limited. Government's main intention on 
privatisation is: 
• to relieve the financial burden on the fiscal 
budget; 
• to earn revenue; and 
• to attract private investors towards 
facilitating the sustainable / profitable growth 
of Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited in a 
competitive environment 
Current status of Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited: 
Highly profitable company projecting ZS85 
million annual profits by end of June 1997. 
Unencumbered balance sheet with less than 
8% debt. 
• Government converted all loans to equity 
(debt/equity swap) and now earning 
dividends as well as tax. 
• Staff conditions of service now market 
related with performance bonuses directed at 
the best outcome for the company. 
• High producer confidence. 
• Sales turnover ZS940 million with a 
capitalisation of ZS400 million. 
The lesson is that development of strategic alliances is 
one way of enhancing the operational effectiveness 
franchising of door to door delivery of milk 
and ice-cream vending. 
franchising of depots and rural delivery 
services; 
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and efficiency' as well as productivity of state 
enterprises. The essence of turnaround is to focus on 
core-business activities and sharpen competitive 
advantages. 
Out-sourcing (contracting out) or sub-contracting is 
one avenue through which competition and 
productivity can be enhanced. Contracting out is an 
arrangement whereby one company spins off to the 
other entity (usually the smaller economic operator) 
its inefficient operations, enabling the established 
company to concentrate on its core business whilst 
leaving it to the more flexible and versatile small scale 
sector to handle varied activities which take up time 
and expense but make little or no contribution to the 
bottom line. This relationship results in an 
improvement in productivity, quality and 
competitiveness. 
Franchising is a system for the distribution of goods 
and services to the customer whereby the owner 
(franchiser) of a well established product, service or 
business format, grants a new entrepreneur 
(franchisee) die right (franchise) to undertake business 
in a prescribed manner over an agreed period of time 
in a specified plan or territory using the business trade 
marks, products, services and business systems 
developed by the franchiser. In return for the rights 
granted, the franchisee pays the franchiser a financial 
compensation, usually an initial franchise fee and 
ongoing royalties. Dairiboard Zimbabwe Ltd has 
successfully privatised and franchised its depots. 
The key issue in privatisation is to ensure that it is 
done as transparently as possible to enhance 
acceptability and broad participation. One can not 
afford to go wrong when privatising a state enterprise, 
because there will be many obstacles along the way. 
When the government announced last year that DZL 
will have to be privatised, several issues had to be 
tackled: 
• debt equity swap; all loans from government 
were swapped and Share Certificates were 
issued; and 
• a program of the privatisation exercise had 
been put together as transparently as 
possible. All our merchant banks (12 in the 
country) were interviewed and given a 
mandate defining clearly the areas they must 
address when they are preparing their bids. A 
consortium of three merchant banks was 
selected. They were given a specific 
responsibility for the privatisation program. 
The government has announced 6 areas which have to 
be targeted for the privatisation program: 
• Participation of the general public; the public 
must buy shares in the company. 
• Large scale producers must buy shares in the 
company. Because of vertical integration 
issues, linkages with the major supplier of 
raw materials are important. 
• Milk production dairies have to be 
democratised and broadened. 
• Company staff have to participate and buy 
shares. 
• The government is mindful of potential 
Stakeholder groups who have been 
disadvantaged because of the past regime. A 
National Investment Trust was set up to buy 
shares on behalf of potential investors in the 
rural area 
• The issue of strategic investor or the 
technical partner. The role of the strategic or 
technical partner is only in the context of 
provision of brand leadership and the 
technical expertise in marketing. 
Privatising Ownership 
Restructuring and Sale of PEs: Kenya 
Airways Case Study 
The privatisation of Kenya Airways in April 1996 was 
the first privatisation of an airline in Africa. It was 
hailed by the Financial Times as 'an object lesson for 
Africa' and as 'an example from which other African 
countries should learn'. Although Kenya was the first 
country to privatise its airline, it is by no means the 
only country that has considered it Air Zimbabwe, 
Ghana Airways, Air Tanzania and South African 
Airways have been considering privatisation. Zambia 
took the more radical measure of completely 
liquidating Zambia Airways, making it the only 
country in Africa that has a completely privately 
owned airline. 
In discussing the Kenya Airways case study, Mr. 
David Namu, Administration Director of Kenya 
Airways, pointed out that the success or failure of 
plans to privatise, commercialise and improve 
productivity in a corporation would very much 
depend on what the government of the day thinks 
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about change. The partnership between the Kenyan 
Government, Kenya Airways and the Kenya Airways 
Privatisation Team is a model of how open and well 
supported communication between Government and 
implementing advisors can make the risky process of 
privatisation possible and successful. 
Kenya Airways was formed as a State-Owned 
Enterprise (SOE) under the Companies Act following 
the break-up of the East African Community in 1977, 
incorporating many of the staff and assets of the old 
East African Airways. 
Privatisation Policy 
In a 1986 "Sessional Paper on Economic Management 
for Renewed Growth" the government stated its 
commitment to privatisation for the first time stating 
that it was going to get out of activities that would be 
best handled by the private sector and to restrict itself 
to providing an enabling environment through 
regulation. However, policy action started with the 
publication of the 'Paper on Public Enterprise Reform 
and Privatisation" in 1992 .This paper defined the 
responsibilities of the Parastatal Reform Committee 
which had been set up in 1991. It also defined the 
functions of the newly upgraded semi-autonomous 
Department of Government Investments and Public 
Enterprises which was going to supervise the 
restructuring of strategic enterprises. 
The stated objectives of the public enterprise reform 
program were: 
• to enhance the efficiency and performance of 
the public enterprise sector. 
• to reduce the financial burden of the sector 
on Government, and 
• to achieve these objectives through the 
introduction of reforms that will enforce 
financial discipline, ensure managerial and 
financial autonomy, and set up adequate 
accountability and appropriate incentives, all 
toward the aim of having public enterprises 
operate on commercial principles. 
More significantly for Kenya Airways was the fact 
that it was one of the 45 out of 207 non-strategic 
public enterprises identified for the first phase of the 
privatisation program. 
Prior to 1992, the governments policy towards 
Kenya Airways involved a mixture of both 
commercial and socio- political objectives. These 
were spelt out in the National Development Plan as 
follows: 
• To operate as a viable commercial venture. 
• To promote the image of the country. 
• To promote tourism and business. 
• To promote export of Kenyan products. 
• To earn Foreign exchange for the country. 
• To create additional employment 
opportunities through improved productivity. 
Restructuring and Commercialisation 
Having been established under company law in 1977 
with ownership vested in the Permanent Secretary, 
Treasury and one share held in trust by the Ministry of 
Transport, the government did not have to go back to 
parliament to seek the amendment or repeal of an 
enabling statute for privatising Kenya Airways. 
A few changes were made to the Company's 
constitutional documents including amending the 
Memorandum and Articles of Association to place it 
on a similar footing to publicly quoted companies. 
These changes were also made to increase the share 
capital in preparation for sale, in recognition of the 
enhanced value of the company following the 
write-off of debts and commercialisation, and finally 
to create headroom for future capital issues. 
It also became necessary to arrange for a legal audit of 
the Company to be undertaken to establish at an early 
stage in the process whether there were any legal 
impediments to the privatisation. 
In April 1991, the government dismissed the entire 
Board and Chief Executive of Kenya Airways and 
appointed a new Board with Philip Ndegwa as the 
Executive Chairman and David Namu as the General 
Manager. Their terms of reference were simple and 
specific: to revive or liquidate the airline and not to 
rely on the financial assistance of the Treasury in the 
process. 
The new management decided to call in Speedwing, a 
consultancy firm which has been involved with the 
privatisation of British Airways, to do a study on all 
aspects of the airlines operations and make 
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detailed review of staffing levels in each 
function. 
• The management skills, organisation and 
culture were not suited to a commercial 
profit-oriented enterprise. 
• Operational performance was not measured 
or controlled. 
• Financial control was very weak with late 
and inaccurate reporting and poor 
accountability. 
• Existing computer systems did not support 
the business adequately. 
• Marketing and revenue generation were a 
major area of weakness. 
• Technical skill levels were good but poorly 
utilised. 
• Customer service standards were low with 
limited measurement and control of quality. 
• Productivity was not routinely measured and 
appeared to be low. 
• In every function there existed an untapped 
source of expertise and enthusiasm, 
particularly at middle and lower levels. 
The following recommendations were made: 
• The following appointments should be made: 
• An airline experienced Chief Executive 
with a clear mandate to implement the 
recommendation of the Speedwing 
Report, 
• An airline experienced Finance Director 
with a clear mandate to introduce new 
financial systems, controls and 
accountability, and develop proper 
budgetary planning, control and 
reporting systems, and 
• An airline experienced Marketing 
Director and carry out a major overhaul 
of the sales and marketing activity. 
• A radical restructuring of the management 
and organisation of the airline, including a 
• A Performance Improvement Programme to 
continuously improve the operational 
performance and reliability of the airline 
should be introduced. 
• Managers should be clearly accountable for 
the performance in their areas of 
responsibility. 
• A new computer system department should 
be created and a complete review of the 
future needs of the airline carried out. An 
implementation plan should be developed. 
• A comprehensive research programme 
designed to identify the needs and views of 
the airline's staff, travel agents and customers 
should be carried out 
• A comprehensive customer service training 
programme for all staff in the airline, based 
on the research, to achieve a cultural change 
within the airline should be implemented. 
• A customer service quality improvement 
programme should be introduced. 
• Productivity measurement and control 
standards should be introduced and standards 
based on internationally accepted levels of 
productivity set 
Two additional recommendations were presented: 
• If privatisation was planned within the next 2 
years, the airline should start behaving like a 
private sector company now. 
• A 5 year business plan should be prepared as 
soon as possible in order to demonstrate a 
track record of achievement against this plan 
ahead of privatisation and to form the basis 
for any negotiations with prospective 
investors. 
Following implementation of the above 
recommendations, success of the commercialisation 
phase was demonstrated by a shift from losses of US 
$ 30 million in 1992/93 to profits of US 7 million in 
1993/94, US $ 17 m. in 1994/95; US $ 19.9 million in 
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1995/96 representing 12% net margin on sales of US 
$ 166 million in 1995/96. 
Privatisation 
Commercialisation was not the goal of the 
restructuring but rather a necessary step towards 
privatisation of Kenya Airways. The privatisation 
process started with appointing the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) to act as the privatisation 
advisor in April 1994. The IFC recommended the 
creation of the Kenya Airways Privatisation 
Committee as a sub-committee of the board, headed 
by Mr. Ndegwa to conduct the myriad tasks of the 
privatisation, in order for its members to be able to 
devote the time necessary to master the details of 
plans and negotiations and thus to be able to brief 
government decision-makers thoroughly whenever 
necessary. Its other members were the board members 
representing the Ministries of Finance and Transport, 
and the Attorney-General's Chambers, along with the 
airline's managing director and finance director. The 
company secretary and the head of the IFC advisory 
team were non-voting members. 
It also recommend that the Government should 
assume the airline's past debts and acquire a strategic 
partner. Specific selection criteria were developed by 
the management and KLM was selected. 
The external debt arrears were assumed by 
Government and the liability of Kenya Airways for 
this debt waived by the foreign lenders through 
moving the debt from Kenya Airways to Government. 
The debt outstanding to Government was converted 
into equity and shares issued to the Treasury for US $ 
30 million. A shareholders' agreement between the 
Government of Kenya and KLM was signed which 
provides for KLM to protect its 26% interest in Kenya 
Airways during any subsequent share sales or issues. 
KLM also agreed not to dispose of any of its shares 
for at least 5 years. The remaining shares are 
distributed as follows; 23% for Government, 3% for 
employees, 14% for emerging market funds and 34% 
for the Kenyan public and Kenyan institutional 
investors. 
The industrial relations problem has been seen as one 
of the causes for the depressed share price of the 
airlines shares due to investor uncertainty. The 
management has dealt with these issues through press 
briefings and a number of lectures given by die 
directors to various groups explaining the privatisation 
process and its rationale. 
The success of the Kenya Airways commercialisation 
and privatisation experience can be attributed first and 
foremost to the Government's political will and clear 
objectives and sense of purpose. The three other 
factors are the choice of the top management, the 
choice of a competent privatisation advisor and the 
choice and use of a competent strategic partner. 
Comparative Commonwealth 
Privatisation Experiences 
Shared experiences in the Commonwealth 
demonstrate in a practical way the ideals of mutual 
systems of co-operation and strengthening the lateral 
needs among Commonwealth countries. In sharing 
experience, it is important to recognise the fact that 
there are similarities as well as diversity which 
enriches the Commonwealth as a group of countries. 
The Jamaican Experience 
The Jamaican experience was presented by Mr. 
Cezley Sampson, Executive Director, Mona 
Institute of Business, University of the West Indies, 
Jamaica. Jamaica experienced 30 years of GDP 
growth at 5% per annum up to 1974. This was based 
on mining where Jamaica became the second largest 
producer of bauxite in the world. After 1974, with 
socialism, everything disappeared. So there is a lesson 
for Botswana not to repeat some of the mistakes that 
Jamaica has made. In terms of rankings of countries 
based on proceeds from privatisation over the period 
1988 - 1992 as a percentage of GDP, Chile, Malaysia, 
Jamaica, UK and New Zealand have been the 5 
leading countries in the world in terms of 
privatisation. In terms of the level of activity in 
privatisation, in Africa, the leading countries are 
Guinea and Libya. 
Unlike Malaysia or New Zealand and Australia, 
Jamaica had corporatised enterprises as early as in the 
1960's. Most of the firms were registered as limited 
liability companies when they were in the hands of the 
private sector prior to 1960 and later the government 
took them over. Therefore, except for the airports and 
the water commission, which were statutory 
corporations, there was very little need for any new 
legislation. 
The structural adjustment programme was first 
introduced in 1977. A conditionality of a second 
programme in 1981 was privatisation. The 
government at the time decided to follow a case by 
case method. For the first five years, very little 
happened and the World Bank, the IDP and USA put 
a lot of pressure on the government to speed up the 
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privatisation programme; otherwise access to 
financing would have to be withdrawn. 
The first major case of privatisation in Jamaica was 
the commercial bank. The government, at the time, 
selected a profitable company and decided that it 
would float a significant portion of the shares on the 
Jamaica Stock Exchange. The strategy adopted was 
to ensure that there was a wide cross section of the 
public participating in the share transaction and a 
whole range of devices were developed to ensure that 
employees participated. The criticism was that the 
shares were underpriced. But the strategy of the Prime 
Minister, at the time, was to demonstrate that 
privatisation could be carried out in a small 
developing country through the Stock Exchange. 
Shortly after the shares were sold, there were 
significant capital gains. The small investors, taxi 
drivers and helpers who participated in the share 
purchase felt that privatisation was a win/win situation 
because they were able to see immediate tangible 
gains. 
In the process of carrying out the privatisation, the 
National Investment Bank of Jamaica provided a 
technical support arrangement but it did not carry an 
overall mandate. There was a privatisation committee 
which reported directly to die Prime Minister. No 
policies or procedures were set out and the socialist 
government which came into power in 1989 criticised 
virtually all privatisations that took place and 
committed itself to reverse most of the transactions. 
Later, a central privatisation point was set up in the 
National Investment Bank and the reporting 
relationship was much more clear. Clear objectives 
were established in terms of what a privatisation 
programme was all about and new procedures were 
established. All concerned parties: the enterprise, the 
Ministries, the Ministry of Finance participate in the 
programme. For each transaction, there was an 
enterprise team which was made up of representatives 
from the key ministries and agencies. At the point of 
doing the actual negotiation, a small negotiating team 
was established to carry out the actual negotiations. 
Thus there was a move from a very informal 
arrangement in the early stages to a highly organised 
and structured programme and, interestingly, the 
socialist party, which had vowed to reverse most of 
the previous privatisations, ended up aggressively 
pursuing privatisation. 
The previous government had said that infrastructure 
and utilities were not to be a significant part of the 
privatisation activities, and yet it was the socialist 
government that decided to include them. Utilities are 
now privatised: water, railways and even the ports. 
The only thing not up for privatisation was the 
beaches. 
What are the lessons? In a small developing 
country, the Stock Market can play an important role 
in the privatisation process. When privatisation 
started, about 10 or 12 companies were listed on the 
Stock Exchange, but with the privatisation of the 
commercial bank, the telecommunication company, 
the cement company, the value of local stocks 
significantly increased on the Jamaican Stock 
Exchange. The question of sequencing is also very 
important. Privatisation must be structured as part of 
a structural adjustment programme. Opening up the 
economy for competition is a central feature of 
privatisation. The competition legislation was very 
important after 30 years of regulated environment and 
restrictive practices. It was necessary to remove those 
monopolistic and restrictive business practices by 
introducing Anti-Trust Legislation. 
Competition is the best regulator and as such it should 
be encouraged wherever possible. There is serious 
criticism of the UK strategy with respect to privatising 
the monopolies. Many economists have now come to 
the view that it is not so much ownership that is 
critical in the privatisation strategy, the focus should 
be on the structure of the industries, particularly the 
larger ones and carrying out the necessary 
un-bundling to facilitate as much competition as 
possible in industrial sectors like Telecommunications 
and Electricity. It is competition which is going to 
drive efficiency and benefit the consumer. This 
strategy helped the government of Jamaica to clarify 
the role of die state and allowed the government to 
focus on education, health and infrastructure facilities. 
It also helped to clarify property rights. Most of 
Commonwealth countries introduced the same 1948 
Companies Act which they inherited from the UK. 
The Companies Act had to be revised. 
In Jamaica, both the workers and the middle class felt 
that they benefited from privatisation. Furthermore, 
privatisation and liberalisation have unleashed a 
tremendous entrepreneurial surge in die Jamaican 
society. 
As part of the privatisation programme, Africa will 
need to pay attention to the whole question of 
fostering entrepreneurship and small business 
development Universities should be developing 
some programmes and courses for enterprise 
management, enterprise culture, developing business 
plans, etc. if the local economy is to be open to a new 
global environment Of course, local conditions will 
differ from country to countiy. Experiences of 
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measures should be built into the process to 
encourage smaller investors. 
The results of privatisation in Jamaica have 
generally been positive. In the first ten years over 50 
companies were transferred to private ownership. Of 
70 entities and assets listed for divestment in Ministry 
Paper # 34 in 1991 more than half were divested by 
1995, and a further 26 added to the list were 
programmed for privatisation. Excluding the 
privatisation of land and municipal services, proceeds 
from divestment over the period 1981-1995 amounted 
to US $275.5 million. Several major corporations in 
banking, telecommunications, airlines, mining, 
agriculture and manufacturing have been removed 
from the public sector. 
Privatisation has been very successful, particularly in 
the cases of firms operating in competitive markets. 
The experience has not been so successful in the 
monopoly areas primarily because not much attention 
was given to the regulatory requirements. Utility 
regulations followed more the price-cap procedure 
rather than the American public utilities rate of return 
structure. 
The lessons to be learnt from the Jamaican 
experience are that: 
• Privatisation must be a part of a 
macroeconomic and structural adjustment 
programme. Sequencing therefore becomes a 
critical problem. In the earlier part of the 
reform exercise, there is need to prepare 
SOEs for divestment This may take the form 
of commercialisation, corporatisation or 
organisational, financial and operational 
restructuring. 
• Privatising water, electricity or 
telecommunications companies requires new 
legislation to set up regulatory frameworks 
on how prices are going to be determined in 
those privatised utilities after they have been 
transferred from the public sector to the 
private sector. 
• Privatisation will only succeed if the various 
sectors in the society perceive individual 
benefits and if the process is transparent. 
• Underdeveloped capital markets in 
themselves are not major impediments to 
privatisation. The general public can be 
responsive to new investment initiatives and 
• In the early stages where the learning process 
is important and there is need to develop the 
technical skills to execute the programme, 
long and ambitious lists of enterprises to be 
privatised can be counter-productive. Success 
is going to be measured against the list The 
selection of a critical number of enterprises 
and demonstrating that privatisation works 
may be preferable to a grand strategy. 
• Old company laws which do not define 
property rights, accountability, and reporting 
responsibilities will require updating. 
• Foreign participation in the investment 
process must be carefully considered and 
planned. 
• The institutional mechanism and the level of 
leadership provided are also critical to 
success. In a small country, a centralised 
institution is advisable. 
The Malaysian Experience 
Presenting the Malaysian experience, Mr. Abdul 
Rahman Baba, Principal Assistant Director, 
Privatisation Section, Economic Planning Unit, 
Prime Minister's Department Malaysia, said that 
the privatisation policy was launched in 1983. The 
policy reflected the Government's commitment to 
reduce its presence in the economy, reduce the level 
of public spending and allow market forces to govern 
economic activities. 
Privatisation was adopted by the Government to meet 
five main objectives. 
• relieve the financial and administrative 
burden of Government. 
• improve efficiency and productivity through 
the introduction of competition, freeing of 
Government enterprises from civil services 
rigidities and the introduction of incentives to 
employees. 
• facilitate economic growth - through higher 
efficiency and profits, the Government will 
be able to gain additional revenue 
particularly in the form of corporate tax to 
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finance projects under its socio-economic 
development plan. 
• reduce the size and presence of the public 
sector in the economy. 
• help meet the national development targets of 
restructuring the ownership pattern in the 
economy. 
The methods used in Malaysia's privatisation 
exercise varied; for a few projects a combination of 
methods have been used as follows: 
• sale of equity as in the case of national 
automotive company (PROTON), Malaysia 
Airlines and Malaysian International 
Shipping Corporation (MISC); 
• sale of assets as in the case of Public Works 
Department's quarries in Selangor and Perak, 
and Maritime Academy. (As for ports, 
movable assets are sold upon privatisation); 
• lease of assets, for example Port Kelang, 
where the immovable assets are leased; other 
examples are Malaysia Airports Bhd., and 
National Railways (KTM) Bhd; 
• management contracts, for example the 
privatisation of the Management of 
Kedahand Selangor Water treatment plants; 
• build-operate-transfer (BOT), 
built-own-operate (BOO) and build-operate 
(BO). Examples are the Kelang West Port, 
North South Highway and other road 
projects, National Sewerage Project (BOT) 
and independent power generation plants 
(BOO); 
• other modes of privatisation include the build 
transfer (BT), land development, 
management-buy-out (MBO), reverse 
take-over through equity swap, and joint 
ventures. 
So far, a total of 408 projects have been privatised 
During the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) 204 
projects were privatised of which 56.4% were Federal 
Government projects and 43.6% State Government 
projects. Of the total, 138 represent existing projects 
involving the taking over of Government's functions 
by the private sector while the rest represent new 
projects. 
The privatisation programme in Malaysia is broad 
based, covering all sectors of the economy. In terms 
of sectoral distribution, the privatised projects were 
mainly in the construction sector accounting for 
22.5% of total projects privatised followed by 
manufacturing sector 15.2% and service sector 11.3%. 
Some major privatised projects are the Ports of 
Kelang and Johor, the Second Link to Singapore, 
Malaysia Airlines, Kuala Lumpur Light Rail Transit 
(LRT), the national power company (Tenaga Nasional 
Berhad), while the seaports of Bintulu and Penang 
have been corporatised. Most of the projects 
privatised during 1991-1995 were through the sale of 
equity method (46.1%), 16.2% through the sale of 
assets method and 10.3% through BOT. 
Privatisation has reduced the financial burden of the 
Government The sale of Government-owned equity 
has generated more than RM22.0 billion in terms of 
proceeds. In terms of operating expenditure, the 
Government has been able to save some RM6.9 
billion annually from privatised projects. As for 
capital expenditure, savings are estimated at RM96.2 
billion. The main financial relief comes from the 
savings on BOT infrastructure projects as these 
represent the amount the Government would have to 
provide as capital expenditure if the projects had not 
been privatised. 
Privatisation has also enabled the government to 
reduce the size of the public sector and relieve its 
administrative burden and responsibility with respect 
to recruitment, promotion and training of personnel. 
To date a total of 98,000 public sector employees 
have been transferred to the private sector. 
There are indications that privatisation has led to 
increased efficiency of the privatisation entities. 
Kelang Container Terminal (KTC) used to handle 
about 19 TEUs an hour before privatisation but 
currently it is handling over 31 TEUs an hour, while 
the average length of time that each container 
remained in the dock declined steadily from 8 days to 
2.8 days. This performance has placed the terminal at 
par, if not better than many other ports in die world in 
terms of container movement Since its privatisation, 
Telekom Malaysia Berhad (TMB) has instituted 
several improvements, such as marketing of new 
services. At the same time, the number of direct 
exchange lines per employee increased by over 55%. 
Similarly, Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TMB), has 
instituted many innovations which have greatly 
enhanced its efficiency and productivity as reflected 
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by its annual profit which has reached RM 1.9 billion 
in 1994 without tariff increase. 
The privatisation of highways has resulted in a much 
faster rate of highway construction in the country, 
thus reducing infrastructure bottlenecks. Privatisation 
has enabled many infrastructure projects to be 
completed earlier such as the construction of the 882 
km North South Highways, which has been completed 
15 months earlier than scheduled. 
In order to increase efficiency, the Government has 
also introduced competition, especially in natural 
monopolies such as energy and telecommunications 
sectors. In the telecommunications sector, the 
Government has licensed six other companies, apart 
from Telekom Malaysia, to provide basic 
telecommunications services. For the energy sector, 
five other companies, apart from TNB are already in 
operation in Peninsular Malaysia through licenses to 
generate issued by the Government 
Privatisation has helped to accelerate economic 
growth; resources released as a result of efficiency 
gains are being utilised for further corporate 
expansion. 
As privatised entities are being listed on the stock 
exchange, ownership of these public companies is 
spread to a wider community and has increased 
participation of employees in the ownership of the 
companies through MBO and sale of equity . The 
policy is that 5% of the company's equity is reserved 
for employees. At the same time, 30% of the share of 
privatised projects is reserved for the indigenous or 
Bumiputera participation. Bumiputera promoters have 
played an important role in the development of new 
projects. 
The provision for foreign investor's participation in 
the privatisation exercise to a maximum of 25% of 
equity signifies the importance of promoting die 
transfer of technologies and skill upgrading through 
privatisation. Foreign participation is allowed in cases 
where the technology needed is not available locally, 
or where international linkages and markets are 
necessary. For instance, the privatisation of the North 
South Highway has exposed Malaysian to new skill 
and expertise in the construction of highways, 
enabling the United Engineers Malaysia Berhad 
(UEM) to complete the construction of the North 
Soudi Highway earlier than scheduled Through the 
projects, designers and local engineers have acquired 
knowledge and skill in highway design and 
construction. In the case of Tenaga Nasional Malaysia 
Berhad (TNB), due to stiff competition particularly 
with the introduction of the Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs) generation systems on a 
build-ope rate-own mode, TNB faces an urgent need to 
shift its management style and skills. To cope with the 
challenges, multi-skills retraining programmes are 
being undertaken in adapting to the new environment 
of corporate management Similarly, Telekom 
Malaysia Berhad (TMB) has gained significantly after 
privatisation, enabling it to introduce new services and 
has marketed aggressively the services that were 
hardly known prior to privatisation. These include 
network upgrading to enhance capacity, and quality of 
services through investment in modern and 
state-of-the-art technology. This has led to modem 
telecommunications services necessary for corporate 
advancement now available in Malaysia. 
To overcome the legal constraints, the government 
has taken a very pragmatic approach by amending the 
relevant laws and regulations to facilitate 
privatisation. The bulk of the legal obstacles with 
respect to land matters, for example, have been 
removed through various amendments made to the 
Federal Constitution in 1987. Legal constraints with 
respect to personnel have been surmounted by 
amendments made to the Pensions Act, 1980 which 
has instituted pension rights for public sector 
employees who have opted to be transferred to the 
private sector. For some entities the provision within 
certain laws of incorporation prohibited the 
privatisation of SOEs and government departments. In 
order to accelerate the privatisation program, various 
successor company acts and amendments were made, 
such as the Telecommunications Act, Electricity 
Supply Act and the Malayan Railway Act. The 
introduction of the Ports Privatisation Act has 
facilitated the privatisation of ports. Existing 
legislation will continuously be reviewed and 
appropriate amendments will be made to facilitate the 
privatisation process. A comprehensive review of all 
the relevant laws is in progress. The objective is to 
formulate a single legislation, which will be a general 
legislation governing the privatisation of all SOEs and 
Government departments including subject matter 
under the State List as per the Ninth Schedule of the 
Federal Constitution. 
In implementing the privatisation program, due 
attention is given to the absorptive capacity of the 
capital market, as it exerts heavy demand on private 
sector financial resources. The capacity of the capital 
market to mobilise domestic resources and provide for 
trading of asset ownership is important as privatisation 
stock issues are often large compared to other equity 
issues. Successful flotation of privatisation stock 
issues is also dependent on the level of other private 
sector demand in the capita] market. To avoid 
crowding-out effects of the capital market, only one or 
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two 'flagships' are targeted per year followed by 
smaller entities to enable the majority of the 
population to participate. During 1991-1995, 24 
privatised companies were listed on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange. Currently 31 privatised 
companies have been listed and contributed about 
20.5% of total KLSE market capitalisation. Among 
the major privatised companies listed are: Telekom 
Malaysia Berhad (TMB), TNB, Petronas Gas, 
Malaysia Airlines System (MAS), Malaysian 
International Shipping Corporation (MISC), 
PROTON and EON. 
With the introduction of new guidelines for the listing • 
of Infrastructure Project Companies (IPCs) by the 
Securities Commission, the privatised IPCs would be 
able to raise financing in the capital market in the 
form of equity to undertake projects. Hence, the IPCs 
are eligible to be listed on the KLSE without having to 
meet the track record requirements, provided that 
these companies are awarded a concession or licence 
by the Government or State agency, in or outside 
Malaysia, with the remaining concession period of not 
less than 18 years. For existing IPCs, the concession 
or licence period required is not less than 15 years. 
Other requirements include, among others, the project • 
cost being not less than RM500 million and the 
project must be able to generate income sufficient to 
give a suitable return to its shareholders. 
Malaysia's privatisation policy has proven to be 
successful and the success can be attributed to 
various factors: 
• The determination and commitment to the 
privatisation programme is strongly 
evidenced by its acceptance by both the 
Government and p e o p l e as an instrument of 
economic management 
• The Malaysian privatisation programme is * 
unique in many ways. First it is based on 
two objectives, to allow the private sector to 
lead economic growth and the public sector 
to provide conducive environment The 
privatisation is based on the Malaysian 
Incorporated concept that is to foster close 
co-operation between the private and public 
sector to achieve economic development 
The private sector is encouraged to submit 
proposals for privatisation and the approval 
for privatisation is based on the merit and the 
benefits that both parties will reap from the 
project The Government's stance has always 
been that the project to be privatised must not 
fail and that the Government is committed to 
ensure that the privatised project will 
succeed. The returning of privatised projects 
to the Government due to the failure of the 
private company to fulfil its obligation, 
should not arise. Therefore companies that 
undertake privatised projects have to be 
carefully chosen with a proven track record 
in terms of expertise and financial strength. 
At the same time, these companies are 
required to implement a "vendor and 
umbrella program" so as to provide 
opportunities to other local companies to 
participate in privatised projects. 
The Government is concerned with the 
viability and performance of the companies 
that undertake privatisation projects. For 
most of the major privatisation projects, 
merchant bankers and consultancy services 
have been employed to undertake studies on 
viability of projects before privatisation. 
Careful consideration is given to the 
projected cash flow of companies after 
privatisation to ensure their capabilities to 
undertake the project in the long term. 
The privatisation program is broad based 
covering various sectors of the economy such 
as telecommunications, energy, 
infrastructure, ports, hospitals, hotel resorts, 
etc. It has also incorporated strong provision 
for employees protection as manifested in the 
procedure requiring inclusion of "no less 
favourable terms of condition of service" and 
an assurance of no retrenchment within the 
first five years except on disciplinary 
grounds. In cases of privatisation which 
involved public listing, the employees are 
given 5% share equity of the privatised 
entity. 
Malaysia's privatisation process is 
transparent The administrative machinery 
established to implement the programme is 
based on the principle of centralised planning 
and decentralised implementation. The 
setting up of the Privatisation Section at the 
EPU creates a separate entity that handles 
privatisation projects objectively, based on 
careful considerations and set policies and 
guidelines, as well as procedures as provided 
in the Privatisation Master Plan. The 
Government has established the Privatisation 
Committee at the Federal level, with the 
Privatisation Section at the EPU as the 
secretariat The permanent members of the 
Privatisation Committee are representatives 
of the relevant central agencies such as the 
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Federal Treasury, the Attorney General's 
office and the Public Services Department, as 
well as other stakeholders from the various 
relevant ministries that have interests in the 
privatisation project. All proposals for 
privatisation, either government initiated or 
private sector-initiated, are evaluated by two 
sub-committees, namely the technical 
committee and the financial committee. 
Evaluation of privatisation proposals has to 
undergo a stringent process, whereby the 
financial committee, headed by the EPU or 
Treasury, will evaluate the financial 
proposals, while the technical committee, 
headed by the relevant ministry, will evaluate 
technical proposals. The overall evaluation of 
the proposal is integrated by the Privatisation 
Committee at the EPU, which will then 
submit its recommendation to the 
Government for a decision. 
• The Privatisation Action Plan is made public 
and thus the public has full knowledge of 
entities to be privatised in the near future. 
• To encourage the private sector to participate 
in privatisation especially for BOT projects, 
various concessionary terms have been 
given, such as tax incentives and soft loans. 
This is to ensure a reasonable return to the 
investor so that the project is viable and at 
the same time the tariff rate charged to the 
public is fair and equitable. Generous initial 
terms have been given to the affected 
employees in privatised entities in order to 
ensure the success of the projects as well as 
to provide added encouragement and 
attraction to the employees to be transferred 
to the private sector. Experience has 
demonstrated that privatisation has not 
resulted in lay-offs, and has in fact resulted in 
improved terms and condition of service. 
This has helped considerably in changing the 
employees' outlook on privatisation. Most of 
the unions have now become very supportive 
of privatisation. 
• Another special feature of Malaysia's 
privatisation programme is the conversion of 
the SOEs into a corporatised entity at the 
initial stage of privatisation in cases where 
direct privatisation may not receive full 
support initially, as in the case of Sabah 
Electricity Board. The corporatised entity, 
fully owned by the Government will be first 
transformed into a commercial enterprise 
under the Company Act. This step will 
enable the agency and its workforce to adapt 
to corporate work culture as well as 
transform it into a commercial entity having 
its accounts run on commercial lines. 
Examples of corporatised entities are the 
ports of Bintulu and Penang, and the 
National Heart Institute. 
The pace for implementing the privatisation program 
will be further intensified as reflected in the Seventh 
Malaysia Plan for 1996-2000. While the emphasis will 
continue to be given towards the privatisation of 
projects in the infrastructure, utilities, and transport 
sectors, efforts will be made to privatise projects in 
other fields, including education and training, health 
and other social services, and R&D. 
The Government's involvement in strategic, high-risk 
and high technology industries as well as in projects 
which require huge investment and long gestation 
periods will be continued. Similarly, the Government 
will continue to hold equity in certain existing 
companies in order to protect public interests and to 
monitor the performance of the privatised entities. 
In conclusion, the pace of privatisation in Malaysia in 
the initial stage has been slow. However, its success 
rate is high. The success is measured not so much 
from the quantity of privatised projects but more 
importantly from the quality of the privatisation 
evidenced by continued improvement of efficiency 
and productivity in the privatised entities. 
The underlying factor of Malaysia's strong and steady 
growth has been partly due to the success of the 
privatisation programme. Other factors include the 
macroeconomic stability and conducive environment 
for private sector participation. The sound monetary 
and fiscal policies pursued by the Government were 
able to induce and sustain private sector investment in 
the economy. Political stability has also provided a 
conducive environment for the nation to focus its 
effort on economic development 
The open and increasingly liberal policy adopted by 
the Government has cleared the path for greater 
private sector participation in the economy and 
attracting foreign investment 
The Zambian Experience 
Mr. Stuart Cruickshank, Technical Director of 
Zambia Privatisation Agency, reviewed the 
Zambian privatisation programme that has been 
implemented over the past few years as an integral 
part of the structural adjustment programme (SAP). 
He noted that the SAP was introduced by the 
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Government of the Republic of Zambia at its own 
instigation and not as a result of donor pressure. The 
privatisation programme in Zambia has been 
recognised as the most successful in Africa if not the 
whole of the developing world. 
The Zambian reform programme adopted by the 
MMD (the Movement for Multi-party Democracy) 
Government elected in 1991 was based on the belief 
that Government's role was to govern and that it is the 
role of the private sector to run businesses. However, 
the Government recognised that in order to develop a 
strong and growing economy, an "enabling 
environment" must be created and the economy 
liberalised. To this end, import and export controls 
have been lifted, State monopolies removed, interest 
rates have been freed up and exchange controls 
abolished. 
The key objective of the privatisation programme is 
to improve corporate governance, thereby obtaining 
the spin-offs that result from an efficient private sector 
with the confidence to invest in Zambia's future. The 
privatisation programme was based on three key 
principles: 
• an independent agency was needed to 
implement privatisation; 
• a programme should be enshrined in an Act 
of Parliament; and 
• the process should be as transparent as 
possible. 
In 1992, the Privatisation Act (No. 21 of 1992) was 
passed for establishing the Zambia Privatisation 
Agency (ZPA) as the agency responsible for 
planning, managing, implementing and controlling the 
privatisation of SOEs. Some minor, but important, 
amendments were made to the Act as of 1 April 1996. 
ZPA's mandate extends beyond privatisation 
transactions. First, it has a mandate to monitor 
expected and actual redundancies arising through the 
privatisation process, and to ensure that redundancies 
are conducted in the most acceptable and effective 
manner. To this end, ZPA, with the prior approval of 
the Minister of Finance, facilitates the funding of 
redundancies from the companies' own resources or 
from the privatisation proceeds. Second, ZPA is 
responsible for approving the disposal and lease of 
assets in all public enterprises which are scheduled for 
privatisation. Under Section 5 of Statutory Instrument 
No. 41 of 1993, those enterprises must apply to ZPA 
for approval to dispose of or to lease assets and must 
JSIPPA 
later account for such transactions through detailed 
returns. Proposed capital investment programmes 
must also be approved by the ZPA and are subject to a 
number of specific criteria. 
ZPA has a Board of 12 members who are nominated 
by their respective organisations and approved by the 
National Assembly. Only three of the members are 
Government officials - the Permanent Secretaries of 
Finance and Commerce, Trade and Industry and the 
Attorney General - the remaining nine members are 
drawn from the following private sector institutions: 
• the Zambia Confederation of Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry; 
• the Zambia Federation of Employers; 
• the Law Association of Zambia; 
• the Zambia Institute of Certified 
Accountants; 
• the Dean of the School of Business of the 
Copperbelt University; 
• the churches in Zambia; 
• the Bankers Association of Zambia; and 
• the Zambia Farmers Union. 
The Board composition has ensured that ZPA is 
independent and is seen to be so. Although an 
independent body, the Government recognised the 
need for the Agency to have a link to the Cabinet and 
appointed the Minister of Commerce, Trade and 
Industry to be the Minister responsible to it for the 
privatisation process. 
The Secretariat of the Agency is headed by a Chief 
Executive and has three divisions namely, the 
technical directorate, administration, and publicity and 
marketing. The agency currently employs some 40 
professional staff and is supported by seven full-time 
advisors. 
Transparency is important not only as protection for 
the implementers of a privatisation programme, but 
also because it gives credibility to the process. Some 
African nations' privatisation activities have frozen 
through public criticism of corruption and political 
manipulation - essentially a lack of transparency. In 
the Zambian case, transparency is achieved both 
through timely publication of information and through 
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the use of independent parties at contentious points in 
the process. The transparency provisions are: 
• a requirement of the Act that the following 
public announcements are gazetted: 
• the divestiture sequence plan; 
• the bidders and the bid prices; 
• successful bidders and reasons for 
success; 
• price of shares; 
• special conditions of sale. 
• a requirement of the Act that a progress 
report be prepared at six month intervals 
detailing the activities of ZPA and giving 
enterprise specific information, 
• the practice that all information about an 
enterprise is published at point of sale, 
including asset and business valuations; 
• a requirement of the Act that valuations are 
done by independent contractors who must 
provide a certificate of valuation; and 
• a requirement of the Act that negotiations are 
done by independent negotiators. 
In addition to the above, the ZPA holds a monthly 
press conference at which the press is given the 
opportunity to question the Agency about any matter 
concerning the privatisation process. Public fora are 
also held every few months giving interested parties 
the opportunity to be informed about all aspects of the 
programme. 
At the commencement of the privatisation 
programme, the parastatal sector comprised 
approximately 160 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
covering every aspect of commerce and trade 
including Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines 
(ZCCM), the large copper mining enterprise that 
accounts for approximately 90 per cent of the 
country's export earnings, as well as other small 
gemstone enterprises, electricity, telecommunications, 
air lines, transport companies, sugar processing, 
breweries, cement, trading companies, fuel, milling, 
edible oil processing, farms, agro- industries, 
commercial banks, hotels, dry cleaners, and travel 
agents. Following its establishment, the ZPA 
privatisation programme divided public enterprises 
into eleven tranches, comprising 137 enterprises for 
privatisation over a five year period. Initially, the 
program excluded ZCCM, the utilities and some other 
parastatals which posed problems if ownership was 
transferred to the private sector. The programme has 
been updated since and now includes 159 enterprises 
including ZCCM and ZAMTEL, the 
telecommunications company. 
After the enterprises to be privatised are tranched to 
the ZPA by Cabinet, the Agency recommends to 
Cabinet the method of divestiture to be used. In most, 
but not all, cases the Cabinet approves the 
recommended method. The modes of privatisation 
are laid down in the Privatisation Act as follows: 
• public offering of shares; 
• private sale of shares through negotiated or 
competitive bids; 
• offer of additional shares in a state owned 
enterprise to reduce government share 
holding; 
• sale of the assets and business of the state 
owned enterprise; 
• reorganisation of the state owned enterprise 
before the sale of the whole or any part of the 
state owned enterprise; 
• management or employee buyouts by 
management or employees in the state owned 
enterprise; 
• lease and management contract; or 
• any other method the Agency may consider 
appropriate. 
Currently, the ZPA has or is in the process of 
privatising some 208 enterprises / units. This apparent 
discrepancy with the figures mentioned previously is 
explained by the fact that some SOEs consist of a 
number of productive units which have been or are 
going to be privatised separately. 
Several important questions related to the issue of 
ownership are raised in every privatisation situation. 
How much of each enterprise should be reserved for 
nationals? How much foreign ownership is needed for 
investment, technology, and management expertise? 
Should the enterprise be offered through private 
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placement or a widespread public offer? Does the 
enterprise need new investment? If so, how can this be 
mobilised? 
In Zambia, early studies indicated that local private 
capital could provide only one third of the financing 
requirements to meet the capital investment needs in 
SOEs and payments for the Government's equity stake 
in parastatals. Zambian industry needs not only 
investment from international investors, but also 
technology, management upgrades and access to 
markets. Nevertheless, there is a real fear by nationals 
that Zambia will be "re-colonised' through economic 
participation by foreigners. 
To address the conflicts on a case by case basis, the 
Government of Zambia decided that the ownership 
strategy for each enterprise would seek to maximise 
the aims of Zambian participation and wide share 
ownership without compromising on efficiency. Early 
in the process, the Eastern European model for 
transferring ownership (generally through voucher 
schemes) rather than ensuring corporate governance 
was discarded. This model was not considered 
appropriate because most Zambians are 
unsophisticated investors and do not have the 
experience as shareholders of businesses to monitor 
performance by management 
In Zambia, the best results were expected from 
strategies to locate a core shareholder who assumes a 
majority equity stake in each SOE. Core shareholders, 
because of their capital commitments aim to enhance 
their investments by managing the commercial risk of 
the operations and demanding good performance from 
management Zambian investors holding minority 
interests in these firms benefit from the control and 
monitoring activities of the core shareholder and have 
time to educate themselves on enterprise performance 
issues gradually. In employing this concept the 
medium to large-size enterprises with profit potential, 
sustainable markets and a good capital base are 
offered by a combination of trade sale of a majority 
share holding (the core shareholder may be either 
foreign or local) and public flotation of a minority 
share holding (initial offer is exclusively for 
nationals.) The core shareholder is identified through 
a competitive bid process, except where the legal 
status of the enterprise precludes open competition. 
There are a number of instances where this occurs, as 
the Government already had minority partners in the 
larger, more profitable SOEs. When the previous 
Government nationalised these industries, it only 
partially nationalised them, creating forced minorities 
with pre-emptive rights of purchase. These minority 
shareholders, because of their long-term involvement 
are strategically placed to become the core investors 
in a more open investment climate. 
The following procedures to promote Zambian 
ownership are used: 
• Small enterprises are only advertised in the 
local press, and the time frame for preparing 
a bid is fairly short. This provides local 
investors a competitive advantage in 
identifying the request for tender and in 
preparing their offer. 
• Thirty enterprises were selected to give 
management and employees the right of first 
refusal. In favouring Zambian ownership, the 
efficiency objective is not compromised, as 
bidders must provide evidence that they can 
operate the enterprises efficiently and gain 
access to capital. Where the offer from the 
management and employees does not meet 
the standards set by ZPA in their evaluation 
of bids, the enterprises are offered on a 
competitive bid basis. 
• There are approximately thirty enterprises 
which would be good candidates for some 
level of public ownership. A maximum of 
thirty per cent of the share capital of these 
enterprises is reserved for Zambians. Where 
the enterprises have minority shareholders, 
these shareholders are requested to forego 
their pre-emptive rights for the shares to be 
offered to Zambians. Most minority 
shareholders expressed their acceptance, in 
principle, to this form of Zambian 
participation, as they too realise the 
importance of domestic ownership. 
One of the problems with ownership is the relative 
unavailability of domestic capital. In the early stages 
of the privatisation programme, several attempts were 
made to persuade either the private sector or donors or 
both to establish privatisation funds whereby 
Zambians could have access to capital, both for the 
purchase of shares and for financing operations in 
newly privatised companies. Neither donors nor the 
private sector were forthcoming in setting up 
privatisation funds and the Government did not have 
available finance. 
A policy, established by the ZPA, is that investors 
may not purchase SOEs if they are not able to meet 
the financing requirements of capital investment and 
working capital for the enterprise. This policy derives 
from the Government's desire to improve the capacity 
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of the SOEs. Unfortunately, this policy affects 
nationals more than outside investors. Given the lack 
of domestic finance, creative methods to allow 
Zambian participation were designed. These 
include: 
• Zambian individuals, management and 
employees are allowed to defer payment for 
the purchase of shares. This policy created 
some implementation problems. Companies 
which are wholly owned by Zambian 
nationals felt that they should have been 
given the same advantages as if they were 
individual Zambian citizens. These 
companies were advised to bid as groups of 
individuals. From the Government's view, it 
is desirable to limit the number of enterprises 
offered on terms in order to reduce its 
administrative responsibilities to safeguard 
its investment and to collect its debt 
However, in the absence of a privatisation 
fund, this is the only feasible way to allow 
credit to nationals. 
• The Privatisation Trust Fund (PTF) was set 
up to promote broad-based local 
participation. The PTF has been set up as a 
warehousing arrangement whereby the 
minority percentage of the SOE shares 
reserved for Zambians (up to thirty percent) 
are retained in trust. The shares are 
transferred to the P1F at no value. Zambian 
individuals and institutional investors (e.g. 
pension funds) are the sole potential buyers 
of the primary share offers. 
Labour is a sensitive issue, but this is one area where 
the Government of Zambia avoided making clear 
policy statements to address the issue. The parastatal 
sector was excessively overmanned and any 
improvement in efficiency would have to be 
accompanied by employment restructuring, regardless 
of ownership changes. In addition, there was no safety 
net in the form of social security, opportunities for 
alternative income generation activities, training for 
skills, or entrepreneurship development In the design 
stage of the privatisation programme, financing 
redundancy payments was identified as a potential 
problem and therefore provision was made, in the 
Privatisation Act to authorise the use of the proceeds 
from privatisation to make such payments to 
employees. There was a great deal of confusion in the 
initial stages, as die ZPA was seen to be responsible 
for the administration of the redundancy programme. 
In the absence of clear policy guidelines. ZPA 
developed ground rules to cater for the process: 
• Prior to privatisation, the SOE and the 
holding company were responsible for the 
payment and administration of redundancies. 
Where the SOE had sufficient funds, 
payment was made from the SOE's own 
resources. Usually, however, the SOE was 
bankrupt and could not afford to make the 
payments. At this point recourse was made 
to the holding company. In certain instances, 
the holding company declined to pay either 
because of a lack of funds or because the 
payments were too high for them to provide 
support Often employees are sent home on a 
"zero work" basis, where they are paid to 
stay at home: in the short term, this was a 
more cost-effective solution. As the funds 
from privatisation are received, however, 
these workers are paid and retrenched. 
• At the time of privatisation, the responsibility 
for payment is that of ZPA. ZPA negotiates 
with prospective owners to limit the 
redundancies arising at transfer of ownership. 
Where new owners identify employees that 
they would not retain, the liability for 
redundancy payments is paid from the gross 
proceeds from privatisation. In practice, at 
the time of privatisation, the enterprises are 
generally not overmanned to any great 
extent This is mainly because of the 
Government's withdrawal of subsidies 
whereby die parastatal sector has been forced 
to retrench prior to privatisation. Generally, 
negotiations with the potential owners are 
successful and redundancies arising at the 
point of sale have been nominal. 
Two labour problems that were not foreseen created 
implementation problems in the privatisation process. 
The first was that employees did not understand that 
their contracts of employment were with the 
enterprise, as a corporate entity, rather than the 
owners. Employees demanded payment of terminal 
benefits as according to them, their contracts were 
being closed with die parastatal sector and new 
contracts entered into with the private owners. This 
perception arose from the fact that employees were 
apparently seamlessly transferred from one parastatal 
enterprise to another. In addition, workers were 
suspicious of the private sector and did not believe 
that the terms and conditions of their contracts would 
be honoured. In fact one of the conditions of sale is 
that employment conditions must be equal to or better 
than before. It should be noted that the ZPA has a 
Social Impact Department that explains the process of 
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privatisation and workers rights to all employees who 
are to be affected by the programme. 
The second problem was that employees viewed 
privatisation as a means to force redundancy offers 
from the enterprise. Employees and their unions tried 
to negotiate an agreement that all employees be made 
redundant and thereafter the workers could take up 
employment with the new owners if they wished. This 
was clearly impractical as the Government could not 
afford to pay terminal benefits, let alone redundancy 
packages. There is no legal basis for this except where 
the identity of an enterprise is being changed. Section 
35 of the Employment Act provides that employees 
shall be entitled to redundancy payments where their 
contract of employment is altered in any way, unless 
employees give written consent to the changes. 
Post privatisation redundancies are clearly the 
responsibility of the new owners, who as part of the 
purchase and sale agreement, agree to honour the 
terms and conditions of the contracts of employment 
Despite the fact that the contracts are with the 
enterprises and the employees are protected by law, 
the new owners are requested to confirm their 
commitment to the employees. This not only forces 
the new owner to explicitly concur with the provisions 
in the contracts, but also provides additional comfort 
to the employees. 
Informing die general public on the issues of 
privatisation is considered an important element 
within the programme. ZPA has produced 
programmes both for radio and television discussing 
various aspects and concerns with the programme. 
Radio programmes have been broadcast in seven local 
languages in addition to English. In addition to the 
normal discussion and panel type programmes, the 
ZPA has sponsored plays with a privatisation message 
which have been widely publicised and well received. 
The programme has been widely marketed throughout 
the world and has received a satisfactory level of 
interest 
Until April 1995, the pace of the privatisation 
programme was very slow with only 13 
enterprises/units being privatised. The perceived 
slowness was due to three key factors, namely; 
• the extensive preparatory work in designing 
and planning the programme; 
• the extensive and detailed work required for 
each transaction; and 
• the opposition and interference by Z1MCO. 
The ZPA was re-organised in April 1995 with a 
stronger Board and a new Chief Executive as well as 
an internal re-organisation. From that time, and with 
the removal of one of the biggest constraints 
(ZIMCO), the pace of privatisation has increased. At 
the end of March 1997, 204 enterprises/units have 
reached the "agreement to sell" stage. A further 33 are 
under negotiation. 
To-date, after paying creditors as necessary, some $ 
50 million has been transferred to the Privatisation 
Revenue Account However, more significantly, more 
than $ 200 million of investment has been promised; 
these promised investments form part of the sales 
agreements and will be monitored by the ZPA to 
ensure compliance. The investment figure will be 
dramatically increased with the privatisation of 
ZCCM, where it is expected that more than $3 billion 
will need to be invested. 
Privatisation In Botswana 
The BOCCIM Report 
In presenting the Botswana Confederation of 
Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM) 
report on privatisation in Botswana, Mr. Emang 
Maphanyane, Chief Executive of the Botswana 
Housing Corporation, stated that the process of 
privatisation is at a very early stage; the talking stage 
and not the doing stage. It was in that context that the 
BOCCIM, being the prominent private sector 
organisation, decided to undertake a study on 
privatisation. The intention was to assist Government 
in examining the issue of privatisation and processes 
involved. Subsequent to this study which was carried 
out by the accounting firm, Coopers and Lybrand, two 
seminars were conducted, and a report was submitted 
to Government for the attention of the Vice President 
and the Minister of Finance and Development 
Planning. 
BOCCIM is yet to receive an official reaction from 
the Government to the report Meanwhile, the 
Government is examining the recommendations of 
that report and a policy statement on privatisation is 
expected in the near future. 
It is worth mentioning that many parastatals including 
Botswana Housing Corporation are members of 
BOCCIM. 
Many parastatals and Government departments and 
agencies have commercial orientation problems and it 
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was thought that some of them should be examined 
since it was not possible to examine them all. Ten 
parastatals were selected and a similar number of 
Government departments and agencies. The study 
came up with six areas which the process of 
privatisation in Botswana should address: 
• Changing relations between the Government 
and parastatals. 
• Restructuring parastatals where necessary. 
• Restructuring commercially oriented 
Government departments. 
• Changing the roles of local councils. 
• Removing any obstacles at each stage of 
transactions. 
• Selecting an appropriate method of sale. 
On the first area of concern, it was unfortunate that 
Government has intervened what would normally be 
commercial decisions, like advising on investment 
decisions, and that Government would lean on some 
of the parastatals to undertake financially un-viable 
activities especially in the rural areas. It was quite 
clear that financial flows between Government and 
parastatals were taking place in a sort of unplanned 
manner in relation to commercial considerations. The 
study accepted that as a shareholder and a legal 
owner, the Government has a right to intervene in the 
operation of parastatals but only in such a way that it 
enhances the performance of the parastatals. This was 
not the case in Botswana according to the study. A 
framework for the relationship between Parastatals 
and the Government was proposed as an initial step to 
possible privatisation. Such a framework should 
address the issue of division of powers; it happens that 
in Botswana some of the parastatals are both actors 
and regulators such as Botswana Telecomms (though 
this is now changing with the new Regulatory 
Authority) and the Botswana Meat Commission. 
Once that had been done it would be p o s s i b l e f ^ 
Government to determine which parastatals could be 
privatised and which could not. 
Two issues frequently came up in the area of 
restructuring parastatals. One was whether to 
establish units of these parastatals in such a way that 
they can be marketable. For example, if we want to 
sell Botswana Housing Corporation, what can we sell? 
BHC has a number of activities: property 
development, maintenance of buildings, building 
designs, financial services and so on. So if we want 
BIPPA 
to privatise BHC, we have to restructure it by creating 
distinct businesses to be offered for sale separately. 
The second issue was the returns that Government 
would get from selling businesses such as these. If a 
parastatal is to be sold as one body, it will be difficult 
to establish its real value. It was also important that 
such marketable units should be of such a size and of 
such a structure that the citizens will be able to buy 
them. 
Regarding the Government Departments, some of 
them in Botswana have commercial operations like 
the Central Transport Organisation or the Printing and 
Publishing Department, but they do not keep accounts 
on which commercial decisions might be made. So the 
study recommended that these Government 
departments be reorganised to get them to apply 
commercial accounting; by charging for their services, 
for instance. Then the Government will be able to 
establish what h is to privatise. It will be possible to 
determine whether it would be cheaper to maintain 
vehicles at City Council or to take them to private 
garages. Currently the information to make those 
kinds of choices is not there. 
The other consideration regarding restructuring the 
Government departments was to assess their 
commercial value. Unless there are some accounts, the 
Government cannot determine die fair market value of 
departments that might be considered for 
privatisation. 
On changing the role of Local Councils, the same 
issues arise. Refuse collection, for instance, staff 
housing, maintenance, etc., are done by the City 
Councils. So what we see in the Central Government 
is duplicated at Local Government level although the 
politics might be different 
Turning now to the obstacles that might be 
encountered in die privatisation process, we have 
policy concerns. The Government does not have a 
policy on privatisation and that is going to be a subject 
of debate among the politicians and others as well. 
The legal framework needs to be changed if we are 
going to privatise parastatals. The statutes establishing 
parastatals will have to be changed to make them into 
companies under the Companies Act 
Privatisation options were also considered keeping in 
mind the implications or expected consequences of 
each privatisation method. Here, the Government has 
to see itself in a different role. It is important that 
competition be promoted. There are concerns about 
jobs and job losses as a result restructuring. In the 
National Development Bank, Air Botswana and 
Botswana Housing Corporation, restructurings led to 
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job losses. But the study suggests that there are ways 
in which such concerns might be minimised or 
accommodated through such measures as employee 
buy-outs. 
The concerns of investors, particularly international 
investors, who will be interested in investing in the 
restructured parastatals and government departments 
had also to be considered. Namely, what other 
conditions need to be put in place for international 
investment and what special incentives for citizens 
need to be offered? 
In Botswana, many parastatals have outstanding debts 
on loans that have been obtained from Government 
through the Public Debt Service Fund. How these 
debts should be handled is an important question. 
There are proposals which would suggest that this 
debt should go with the assets when it is privatised 
and let the new owners continue to repay it to the 
Government. This happened when the Financial 
Services Company was privatised, for example. 
Care must be taken of the special interest groups such 
as politicians and the media. Through promotion and 
other measures the privatisation process can be made 
attractive to the majority of the citizens. 
On the issue of scheduling the privatisation 
programme, it is important to prioritise. We should 
make a privatisation plan based on a policy decision 
by the Government The study recommended that 
there should be a committee on privatisation 
comprising the major Ministries in die country and 
also members of the private sector. The 
implementation should be left to mother Ministries. 
To this committee, a privatisation unit with qualified 
staff should be created to act as a secretariat and to 
backup the various Ministries in the privatisation 
process. Such a technical unit should be based in the 
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. 
Discussion: 
Mr. Cezley Sampson from Jamaica: 1 am not too 
happy with what I heard. I think you have forgotten 
one very important thing "the learning curve". You 
are going to make a lot of mistakes. We learned the 
hard way in Jamaica that in the first three to four years 
- unless you are going to pay a lot of fees to bring in 
foreign consultants - there are going to be a few hard 
battles. Rather than making elaborate plans and 
elaborate lists, identify three or four agencies and use 
them to demonstrate and learn the process of 
privatisation. It would also be useful to have a closer 
look at the experience of other similar countries such 
as Jamaica. 
Professor Mike Faber from MFDP: I want to talk 
about the status of the report its character, the 
character of its recommendations and then a paradox. 
The report was commissioned by BOCCIM, which is 
a private sector organisation though with public sector 
members, and financed mainly by the USAID. It was 
handed over to the Minister of Finance and 
Development Planning in August but its status was a 
little unclear. Was it just a study which the 
Government was asked to look at and react to? Was it 
a position and a set of recommendations by 
BOCCIM? I was told that the recommendations had 
the support of the Executive Committee but I found 
out from some of the members that they didn't agree 
with those recommendations. 
The character of the report is in two parts. First there 
is a sort of general set of principles suggesting that a 
commercial approach to running the public sector as a 
whole should be adopted. There should be an arms 
length relationship between Government and 
parastatals. Parastatals should have more 
independence but they should be monitored and 
perhaps regulated more closely. A number of 
Government departments should be tinned into 
parastatals. Accounting should be introduced into 
Councils. General recommendations such as are these 
take up about a third of the report and the other two 
thirds are these fourteen case studies or enterprise 
profiles and that is the character of the report 
On the character of the recommendations, the 
impression from reading the press is that there is a 
widespread set of recommendations for privatisation. 
But if you read the report carefully, there isn't much in 
fact A lot of the recommendations are of the general 
kind that I have mentioned, and a lot of them take the 
form of: if Government wants to privatise, it should 
consider doing it this way or if it is willing to allow 
things to be determined by market forces this is what 
should happen. In other words, they are sort of 
hypothetical recommendations. It also recommends an 
implementation machinery which is certainly not 
being criticised but is certainly not being adopted or 
accepted or perhaps not even considered by 
Government yet Now thafs not policy, ifs simply a 
recommendation by consultants who were employed 
by BOCCIM to produce a report. 
Finally, the paradox is that if you take these 
recommendations and they are all fulfilled you will 
end up not with less parastatals than you have at the 
moment but more. 
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Professor Charles Harvey from BIDPA: I just want 
to point out an oddity on the list that we were shown 
of the candidates for privatisation. The oddity is 
BMC, because the BMC has always had on its board 
cattle farmers. In other words the clients of the BMC 
have been in charge of it as an institution and they 
have made sure, by and large, that it is an efficient 
marketing and manufacturing institution and it stands 
out in stark contrast to most public sector agriculture 
marketing boards in Africa, which are mostly a 
disaster. At one time, there were 100 000 employees 
of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board which was 
about twice as many as there were cocoa farmers. 
Now the BMC is not like that, though it has, no doubt, 
some faults. Because it has got farmers on the board, 
it would not be a priority candidate for privatisation, 
in my view, for exactly that reason. Now there is a 
further lesson from that, which is that Government has 
taken a false analogy from the private sector and said 
"because we own parastatals, therefore we should 
appoint the directors" and so the directors of 
parastatals are, by and large, government officials and 
the consumers are not represented. How many 
business consumers of electricity are on the board of 
the Power Corporation? How many consumers are on 
any board? So there is a lesson there too, in that 
government should not just appoint Government 
people because it owns all the shares. I was in the 
Gambia once and there was a Gambia Produce 
Marketing Board. I asked how many farmers were 
represented on it and the person looked at me and said 
"well none of course, its a Government corporation !". 
Next Person: We have heard a lot of debate about the 
weakness of the public service in Botswana and how 
it will be a lot better to privatise. I think within the 
region, our public service is a strong one but our 
private sector is extremely weak. We have to be very 
careful about privatising and not go for it just because 
it is a fashion to do so. 
Next Person: If we are really serious about 
privatisation, it has to be an independent body 
composed of people who know what business is all 
about and who can appreciate the need for such 
activities and sort out priorities. This body has to be 
directly under the President, otherwise it will just 
disappear in bureaucratic files. It is quite interesting 
that we are discussing privatisation now while the 
whole thing was sparked by the budget speech of 
about three years ago. It was mentioned strongly in 
the first year, last year it was also mentioned, but this 
year I listened carefully and there was nothing about 
i t 
Next person: Amongst the list of candidates for 
privatisation which where examined was the 
Gaborone City Council. But most Councils are now 
fighting to get their financial autonomy to be able to 
perform to a certain standard. I can understand how 
commercialising the City Councils or the District 
Councils could improve their performance but I don't 
know how the privatisation can affect them. I just 
want a clarification on how to separate privatisation, 
autonomy and commercialisation. 
Response from Mr. Maphanyane: Quite clearly, as 
can be seen from the comments that have been made, 
the debate is just starting. I did say in my introductory 
remarks that the study was intended to be an input into 
the process of discussing the direction and content of 
privatisation in Botswana and that the reaction of 
Government by way of a policy is still being awaited. 
This report is a product of consultants hired by 
BOCCIM which is a private sector organisation. That 
is the status of this document It is not an official 
policy of the Botswana Government Those are the 
issues that the private sector has put to the country in 
an effort to assist those looking at this matter in an 
organised manner. I entirely agree with our colleague 
from Jamaica that there has to be learning time. I did 
point out that there has to be prioritisation of the 
process taking into account our capacity to manage 
the process. 
I have no concern about the location of the agency. 
But whether we are not under pressure and should 
take our time, in Botswana once you take your time it 
becomes forever. I think we need to have pressure of 
some sort otherwise we would not move. 
Professor Faber is fully aware of the status of the 
study and whether it is hypothetical or not The issue 
of whether one is going to have more or less 
parastatals, I explained why there will be an 
intermediate stage of more parastatals. It was felt to 
be necessary. 
On Professor Harvey's comment about BMC; I think 
the question of whether BMC cannot be made more 
efficient is debatable but I don't believe that BMC is 
as efficient as it can ever be. Perhaps, one of the ways 
of making the private sector strong is to privatise all 
the Government activities. The reason why the private 
sector is so weak is that Government is doing the most 
in taking away its business. I am not saying that 
Government was wrong to enter into business 
activities but times have changed and perhaps the 
public service is also weakened by the fact that it is 
engaged in so many things. Maybe Government 
should refocus and do only those things that the 
private sector cannot do. 
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The Councillor was concerned about the distinction 
between the autonomy the Councils were hoping to 
get and privatisation. I don't think there is any conflict 
between the two. In fact 1 believe that privatisation 
will assist Councils in becoming more autonomous 
because they don't have to be engaged in collecting 
rubbish and maintaining vehicles. They will be 
concerned more about activities that cannot be done 
the private sector and that will reduce their demand 
for subsidies from Government because they would 
not have to provide funding for such activities. 
Panel Discussion 
Further discussion of privatisation in Botswana was 
lead by a four member panel, each of which focused 
on one aspect of the debate. The panel consisted of 
Mr. G. Thipe, Deputy Secretary for Financial 
Affairs, MFDP (as Chair), Mr. D. Namu, 
Administration Director of Kenya Airways, (as 
external expert), Mr. G. Kayira, Deputy Resident 
Representative, UNDP (as specialist in labour 
issues), Professor M. Faber, Principal Consultant, 
Public Enterprise Monitoring Unit, MFDP (as an 
independent expert), and Mr. ML Modisi, Director, P 
S Construction (as a private sector representative). 
Addressing the issues related to BMC and speaking as 
an independent observer, Professor Faber, observed 
the recommendation about BMC in the BOCCIM 
report was rather curious. It recommends the 
privatisation of BMC, not because it would 
necessarily make it any better or serve the farmers or 
the community or the Government any better but 
because a privatisation programme needs a few sort of 
bright stars to start off with. According to the report, 
"the sale of BMC's core operations by a public issue 
would be one of the highlights of the privatisation 
programme of Botswana". Another observation about 
the BOCCIM report on BMC is that it values BMC at 
about P 147 million which is a little bit less than US $ 
50 million. It recommends that of the privatisation 
proceeds 75% should go to Government and maybe 
because of the size of the issue Government will keep 
40% of the proceeds and issue 30% on the Stock 
Exchange and 25% should be distributed free to 
farmers. The difference between fee price at which 
farmers sell cattle to BMC and the price at which 
BMC sells the cattle into its various markets (after 
meeting all its costs) is what has built up the value of 
BMC. If so, there is no justification in Government 
having 75 % because BMC was lent a sum of money 
by Government to buy the physical attributes from the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation. BMC has 
repaid that money and owes Government nothing on 
that behalf and all the equity value that has been built 
up in BMC therefore belongs to the farmers who have 
actually sold their cattle to BMC. 
Another participant asked whether privatisation is 
going to lead to more or less happiness for workers. 
The answer is not clear cut because one could also ask 
whether people living in countries with higher income 
per capita are happier than those living in countries 
with low income per capita. 
Commenting on privatisation and job security, Mr. 
Namu said that there is no employer who can 
guarantee job security. It is the employee who can 
guarantee himself a job by making a contribution to 
the company. But workers who fall out as a result of 
restructuring normally find themselves better jobs. 
On the BOCCIM report recommendation of 
converting some of the Government departments into 
parastatals, which paradoxically will lead to more 
parastatals than what we want to dispose of, Mr Seng 
cited the Singapore experience of converting 
organisations into corporate bodies and privatised 
bodies. In Singapore, Government departments were 
converted into something called Statutory Boards 
which is not different from parastatals. Thereafter, 
once the statutory boards have performed well they 
are converted into corporatised bodies. This was done 
for many organisations but there was one exercise in 
particular in which Government hospitals were 
converted into corporatised bodies without going into 
a statutory board. It was then realised that because of 
the Government accounting systems a lot of hospital 
costs that were being supported by the Government 
were not factored out. By the time the hospital 
realised the full cost accounting that goes into 
supporting the hospital, the actual cost of delivering 
health care has gone up significantly. And when debt 
was passed on to the public there was a big outcry. 
Because of the difference in accounting practice from 
cash accounting to commercial accounting, particular 
attention has to be paid and time given for the 
transition to take place. 
The next person pointed out that some issues have 
been under-emphasised. Is a crisis necessary to 
promote privatisation? It seems that Botswana is not 
necessarily facing a crisis. One would suggest that all 
countries are facing a crisis of the post-Uruguay 
world, post-Lome Agreement and, many other 
arrangements under the GATT are ending. This leads 
to a second issue in terms of the agenda of 
privatisation. Many countries are now developing a 
national competitiveness policy to confront this new 
crisis of the post-Uruguay world. If Botswana is 
considering a national competitiveness policy, this 
policy needs to be linked with privatisation. The 
43 
COMPETITION. PRODI JCTIVITY & PRIVATISATION JBIHEA 
intention is to use privatisation not just to transfer 
operations from the Government to the private sector, 
but to try to use it as an opportunity to create new 
private sector capacities which otherwise would not 
exist. This is a fairly tricky policy. It is being 
attempted in Mauritius to a certain extent. The final 
point is the matter of transfer costs and transfer 
problems in privatisation, particularly re-deployment 
of labour which appears to be a critical issue. How 
does one cope with this ? It is a reality that it is a very 
expensive procedure. In the UK for example it was 
funded by two methods. First through the oil revenues 
and secondly through the European regional funds. 
Those were the only facilities which enabled a 
relatively smooth transfer without serious social 
disruption. If Botswana is in a lucky position 
compared to many developing countries, it may a 
good idea to consider a possible need for a reserve 
fund to facilitate a process of transfer and 
re-deployment of labour. 
Closing Remarks 
In his closing remarks, Mr. Lepetu Setshwaelo, 
Executive Director of BNPC, highlighted the fact 
that the seminar succeeded in bringing the issue of 
privatisation into the national agenda and raising the 
level of debate from pure intellectual talk to a 
practical level using some case studies from Jamaica, 
Kenya, Malaysia, Singapore, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. It also contributed to improving the 
knowledge and the understanding of the concept and 
the practice of privatisation in Botswana. 
All case studies were very helpful and instructive of 
where Botswana should go in this area. The current 
strategy in Botswana is to look at areas of productivity 
and competitiveness. It has to do with the challenges 
of the 21st century as they are looming. 
The Vice President in the last two budget speeches has 
referred to the poor performance of parastatals in 
Botswana. Some of the case studies presented here 
were by former public officers at least in Tanzania 
and Kenya. They were enthusiastic about supporting 
the issue of privatisation. Had we not been warned 
that we should get there slowly, we should start 
tomorrow listening to their presentations. But we have 
been advised by other experts here that the learning 
curve is quite a long one, "don't hurry". The problem 
is that "don't hurry" is inherently a part of Botswana 
culture. So if you tell a Motswana not to hurry with a 
project like that, we might just advance with 
privatisation in the next generation. 
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